Despite a different focus, all chapters are strongly linked. In addition, the later chapters in some cases build on results from earlier chapters. All chapters are written in such a way that they can be read independently of each other. This means that some repetition and overlap between the chapters cannot be avoided. Below, I summarize all chapters.Chapter 2: Fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles Incumbent governments tend to implement expansionary fiscal policy in the proximity of elections, believing that this will increase their re-election chances by handing out gifts, stimulating the economy, and signaling competence to voters (Nordhaus, 1975;Shi and Svensson, 2006). However, using fiscal policy to "buy" votes is often inefficient and can be harmful to the economy, especially when the economy does not need fiscal stimulus (e.g., because it is already performing well). Fiscal rules can make it a whole lot harder to pursue opportunistic policies during election years as they limit fiscal policy discretion. Therefore, the rules lower the room for such fiscal manipulations.In Chapter 2, I examine whether fiscal rules constrain these election cycles in fiscal policy, also referred to as political budget cycles. I consider a panel of 77 democracies and investigate their fiscal policies between 1985 and 2015. I estimate simple fiscal reaction functions and take the effect of elections and fiscal rules on the government budget balance into account. In line with previous studies (e.g., Shi and Svensson (2006)), I find that elections deteriorate government budgets, with an increase of approximately 0.5% of GDP in budget deficits. Fiscal rules, on the other hand, significantly improve the government budget. In particular, I note that these rules reduce the size of political budget cycles, while the effect of elections on the government budget seems fully contained in countries with considerably tight fiscal rules.Further analyses show that the effect of fiscal rules on dampening fiscal profligacy during elections persists irrespective of other factors that might explain this, such as the freedom of the media or the level of public debt. Moreover, I observe a strong effect of fiscal rules in countries with a higher level of globalization, fewer checks and balances, left-wing governments, and established democracies. Finally, I show that after the global financial crisis, the design of fiscal rules has improved, and with it their effect on political budget cycles.Overall, the results suggest that strong fiscal rules are desirable for mitigating budget deterioration during elections, but certain factors make them more (or less) necessary.
Do fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles?*This chapter is published as Gootjes et al. (2021)