Fiscal rules for subnational governments

Abstract

FISCAL FEDERALISM WORKING PAPER SERIESThis series is designed to make available to a wider readership selected studies drawing on the work of the OECD's Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government. Authorship is usually collective, but principal writers are named. The papers are generally available only in their original language (English or French) with a short summary available in the other.OECD Working Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author(s).Working Papers describe preliminary results or research in progress by the author(s) and are published to stimulate discussion on a broad range of issues on which the OECD works. This working paper has been authorised for release by Elsa Pilichowski, Director, Public Governance Directorate.

Riding the rollercoaster

“…For instance, (Vammalle & Bambalaite, 2021a) find that the most common fiscal rules for SNGs concerns debt rules. Only a few countries do not have debt rules, and these are mostly federal countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Canada, and Switzerland) or highly decentralised ones, such as Finland.…”