Fiscal transparency puzzle and electoral institutions: applying a 3Ds approach for tracking the action cycle in Egypt

Abdellatif, Lobna; Hassan, Mazen; Youssef, Noha H.; Zaky, Mohamed

doi:10.1080/13572334.2016.1202646

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…For example, Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) and Reinikka and Svensson (2011) show that transparency can reduce corruption only if it enables citizens to hold government officials accountable and if the disclosed information is accessible to the free press. In addition, Abdellatif, Hassan, Youssef, and Zaky (2016) find that the electoral system is a dominant factor in shaping the final effect of transparency given its influence on political incentives. Nevertheless, empirical evidence is still required to disaggregate fiscal transparency, in particular to understand the essential elements and prerequisites that help fiscal transparency better to contribute to the desired outcomes (de Renzio & Wehner, 2017).…”

Section: Budget Credibility and Fiscal Transparency: A Review Of The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fiscal transparency, fiscal forecasting and budget credibility in developing countries

El-Berry

Goeminne

2020

Journal of Forecasting

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Section: Budget Credibility and Fiscal Transparency: A Review Of The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fiscal transparency, fiscal forecasting and budget credibility in developing countries

El-Berry

Goeminne

2020

Journal of Forecasting

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“…For that, the rules of Civil Service Law No. 81/2016 [4] that bring together the set of administrative institution attributes with regard to Egypt's civil service, in spite of their significance; in the absence of result based orientation for budgeting, they still stand for control and discipline input tracking.…”

Section: Reps 42mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Abdellatif et al (2016) provided a summary of these developments, according to which it can be seen that budget institutions in Egypt have been subject to reforms proclaimed in Budget Law 2005. Three types of rules have been presented: constraint rules, procedural rules and transparency rules.…”

Section: Mapping the Public Management Institutions In Egyptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public management institutions’ alignment: the case of Egypt

Abdellatif

Emara

2019

REPS

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Purpose This paper aims to show the aligned development that took place in public administration and public financial management toward serving public values. By analyzing the mode of institutions’ interaction, the paper attempts to pinpoint the changing trends in budget institutions in Egypt, probing the extent to which they can be read from an administrative perspective and the possibility of enhancing budgetary outcomes under the existing administrative arrangements. Design/methodology/approach An analytical framework for public management administrative and budgetary institutions’ alignment is presented. A ladder analysis is developed to highlight the consistency of rationale between the two sets of institutions. The alignment is demonstrated at three consecutive levels: control and discipline, efficiency and effectiveness and openness and communication. Findings The international experience reveals that the alignment of administrative and budgetary institutions is both theoretically traceable and practically applicable in the case of developed economies. Whereas, in the case of Egypt, both sets of institutions have been exposed to best practices; yet, they are not seen as complementary and enforcing each other. The internalization of the benefits of reforms in the two tracks into an integrated public management context in the case of Egypt is not reached. Practical implications Egypt needs to ensure the alignment of both dimensions to maximize the benefits of reform. Originality/value The ladder approach sorts the developments in both administrative and budgetary institutions into three levels to help assessing the maturity and conformity in countries’ public management systems.

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The impact of budgetary and political institutions on fiscal cyclicality: Evidence from Egypt

El-Khishin

Zaky

2021

JGR

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We investigate the cyclicality of fiscal policy in Egypt during the period of 1976–2019 with a focus on how budgetary and political institutions affect fiscal performance during economic cycles. We define new variables for budgetary and political institutions and incorporate them in a vector error correction model (VECM) and impulse response functions (IRFs) analysis. While current and capital spending are proven to behave procyclically, revenues respond countercyclically during business cycles. Poor political and budgetary institutions have a negative impact on the primary deficit in a way that led to procyclical behaviour in fiscal policy in the long run. We recommend reinforcing the Golden Rule and changing the nature of the electoral system to a party-based to strengthen the role of parliament in keeping the government accountable

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Fiscal transparency puzzle and electoral institutions: applying a 3Ds approach for tracking the action cycle in Egypt

Cited by 4 publications

References 23 publications

Fiscal transparency, fiscal forecasting and budget credibility in developing countries

Fiscal transparency, fiscal forecasting and budget credibility in developing countries

Public management institutions’ alignment: the case of Egypt

The impact of budgetary and political institutions on fiscal cyclicality: Evidence from Egypt

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