Fish do not feel pain and its implications for understanding phenomenal consciousness

Abstract

Phenomenal consciousness or the subjective experience of feeling sensory stimuli is fundamental to human existence. Because of the ubiquity of their subjective experiences, humans seem to readily accept the anthropomorphic extension of these mental states to other animals. Humans will typically extrapolate feelings of pain to animals if they respond physiologically and behaviourally to noxious stimuli. The alternative view that fish instead respond to noxious stimuli reflexly and with a limited behavioural repertoire is defended within the context of our current understanding of the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of mental states. Consequently, a set of fundamental properties of neural tissue necessary for feeling pain or experiencing affective states in vertebrates is proposed. While mammals and birds possess the prerequisite neural architecture for phenomenal consciousness, it is concluded that fish lack these essential characteristics and hence do not feel pain.

The proximate architecture for decision‐making in fish

“…; Branson ; Braithwaite ; Turnbull and Huntingford ; Kittilsen ; Malafoglia et al . ; Braithwaite and Ebbesson ; Brown ; Key ). Discussions of farmed animal welfare are strongly influenced by the five freedoms outlined in the Brambell Report, which includes freedoms from pain, discomfort and fear, and the freedom to express normal behaviour (Brambell ).…”

“…Can we model fish welfare? There has been a substantial increase in the interest for fish welfare over the past decades (Needham and Lehman 1991;Chandroo et al 2004;Branson 2008;Braithwaite 2010;Turnbull and Huntingford 2012;Kittilsen 2013;Malafoglia et al 2013;Braithwaite and Ebbesson 2014;Brown 2015;Key 2015). Discussions of farmed animal welfare are strongly influenced by the five freedoms outlined in the Brambell Report, which includes freedoms from pain, discomfort and fear, and the freedom to express normal behaviour (Brambell 1965).…”

Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization

“…Although few would doubt that most mammals are conscious, debates revolve around the possibility of fish, cephalopods, crustaceans or insects being conscious, and more specifically, feeling pain (Allen (2004); Edelman et al (2005); Edelman and Seth (2009);Elwood (2012); Godfrey-Smith (2017); Griffin (1976); Tye (2017)). The most central debate features proponents of consciousness in animals such as fish (Braithwaite (2010); Huntingford et al (2006); Jones (2013); Sneddon (2011)) and insects (Barron and Klein (2016)) versus opponents to the existence of consciousness in those animals (Derbyshire (2016); Rose (2007); Rose et al (2014); Key (2015Key ( , 2016; Key et al (2016)). …”

Development of resources to promote best practice in the humane dispatch of finfish caught by recreational fishers

“…). While the science of whether fish can experience pain remains highly uncertain (Rose ; Browman & Skiftesvik ; Key ; Rose et al . ), this does not preclude consideration of their welfare, as the fact that fish can experience stress when subject to unfavourable conditions is well documented and can be measured using functional criteria (Arlinghaus et al .…”

“…Fishing is one of several factors that can influence the welfare of finfish and other aquatic animals in wild fisheries (Diggles et al 2011), and in recent times, there has been increased interest in the welfare of fishes caught in wild capture fisheries (Hastein et al 2005;Davie & Kopf 2006;Cooke & Sneddon 2007;Diggles et al 2011). While the science of whether fish can experience pain remains highly uncertain (Rose 2007;Browman & Skiftesvik 2011;Key 2014;Rose et al 2014), this does not preclude consideration of their welfare, as the fact that fish can experience stress when subject to unfavourable conditions is well documented and can be measured using functional criteria (Arlinghaus et al 2009;Diggles et al 2011).…”