2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1471-0366.2011.00351.x
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Fishing for Development? Tuna Resource Access and Industrial Change in Papua New Guinea

Abstract: Papua New Guinea (PNG) is an island state with sovereign rights over valuable tuna resources. Historically, PNG captured value from tuna only by charging licensing fees to foreign fishing fleets, which relegated PNG as a source of raw material for the global tuna industry. To capture more value from tuna – including much‐needed jobs and infrastructure – the PNG government now offers firms that invest in domestic tuna processing plants strategic, long‐term fishing licences. This strategy of ‘obligating embedded… Show more

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Cited by 47 publications
(59 citation statements)
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“…For this reason, social and power relations and institutions that organize resource access, property, and ownership in resource systems (Ribot and Peluso 2003, Mansfield 2007, Sikor and Lund 2009, Campling et al 2012, De Alessi 2012, Havice and Reed 2012, as well as processing, marketing, and trade issues across multiple scales, are important to the understanding of the implementation and effects of certification and eco-labeling in particular contexts. These relations and institutions proved significant in shaping the different certification experiences of the Mexican and Canadian cooperatives.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For this reason, social and power relations and institutions that organize resource access, property, and ownership in resource systems (Ribot and Peluso 2003, Mansfield 2007, Sikor and Lund 2009, Campling et al 2012, De Alessi 2012, Havice and Reed 2012, as well as processing, marketing, and trade issues across multiple scales, are important to the understanding of the implementation and effects of certification and eco-labeling in particular contexts. These relations and institutions proved significant in shaping the different certification experiences of the Mexican and Canadian cooperatives.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In PNG government policy has been to capture value from tuna resources by shifting from 'first' to 'second'-generation access agreements where the national fisheries agency offers foreign fishing firms favorable tuna fishing terms (e.g. no access fee and long-term fishing security) in exchange for onshore investments in tuna processing plants [64]. Although aimed at creating jobs and economic development opportunities for the benefit of PNG, underspecified government interpretations of what constitutes development and follow-up assessments, as well as exploitative behavior observed among firms involved in the access agreements have led to secondary, spillover, effects on local SSF.…”
Section: Type 3: Market Spillovermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These include squeezing out of local fishers and fish markets, thus changing livelihood and marketing opportunities for local fishers. Though it is difficult to quantify ecological change in this sector, local actors argue that industrial fishing is reducing the tuna resource base and that industrial fishing and processing activities are also harming nearshore reef fisheries [64]. Further knock-on effects with largely social implications for the local communities include the growing prostitution linked to the tuna boats associated with the processing plants.…”
Section: Type 3: Market Spillovermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, as Bailey et al (2012) note, the theoretical evidence for cooperative governance arrangements of fisheries, including tuna fisheries, is in stark contrast to their successful implementation. The voluminous literature on cooperation around tuna fisheries in the WCPO focuses on how 'resource rent rivalry' has been driven by a combination of competition for access by distant water fishing nations (DWFNs), the dependency of many Pacific Island countries on tuna for national income, and aspirations for domestic social and economic development (Campbell 1989;Barclay and Cartwright 2007;Havice 2010;Parris 2010b;Havice and Reed 2012;Gagern and van den Bergh In Press). Incentives for cooperation around tuna, like many other marine fishery regions around the world, are therefore underlined by the need for generating domestic wealth from shared resources -which under pressure from divisive treaties and aid relations represents an archetypal prisoner's dilemma.…”
Section: Distribution Of the Costs And Benefits Of Conservationmentioning
confidence: 99%