1986
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.ns.36.120186.000503
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Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

Abstract: log e 1.g e Japan 23.3/33 7.5/9 13.9/15 0.7 2.0 Korea (South) 2.7/4 4.7/5 3.5/4 Libya 0.8/2 Luxembourg Mexico

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Cited by 7 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…have been developed for fuel reprocessing could be used for the extraction and diversion of fissile materials for the clandestine production of nuclear weapons. Scientific arguments have been put forth that the reprocessing technology most suited for FBR applications (electrochemical) is non-proliferating by design (Hannum et al, 1997), meaning that the recycled materials could not be used to make a nuclear weapon without significant further processing (DeVolpi, 1986). These facts have so far had little effect on the positions of political opponents of fuel reprocessing.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…have been developed for fuel reprocessing could be used for the extraction and diversion of fissile materials for the clandestine production of nuclear weapons. Scientific arguments have been put forth that the reprocessing technology most suited for FBR applications (electrochemical) is non-proliferating by design (Hannum et al, 1997), meaning that the recycled materials could not be used to make a nuclear weapon without significant further processing (DeVolpi, 1986). These facts have so far had little effect on the positions of political opponents of fuel reprocessing.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%