1990
DOI: 10.1016/0029-5493(90)90107-9
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Fission product behaviour and graphite corrosion under accident conditions in the HTR

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Cited by 16 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…For there to be any substantive radiological consequence from a severe accident at a HTGR-type SMR, it is thus necessary to postulate a means of failing the TRISO fuel. The SiC layer in TRISO has been demonstrated to be largely resistant to chemical attack and maintains its capability to retain fission products up to 1600°C [21][22][23][24][25]. In analyses of various HTGR accident scenarios, including pressurized loss of forced Ccrculation (equivalent to a loss-of-flow accident in a water-cooled plant), Depressurized loss of forced circulation (D-LOFC, equivalent to a loss-of-coolant accident in a watercooled plant), and reactivity-initiated accidents (including failure to scram), peak fuel temperatures are below this 1600°C limit [18,19,[26][27][28].…”
Section: Hypothetical Accident Progressionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…For there to be any substantive radiological consequence from a severe accident at a HTGR-type SMR, it is thus necessary to postulate a means of failing the TRISO fuel. The SiC layer in TRISO has been demonstrated to be largely resistant to chemical attack and maintains its capability to retain fission products up to 1600°C [21][22][23][24][25]. In analyses of various HTGR accident scenarios, including pressurized loss of forced Ccrculation (equivalent to a loss-of-flow accident in a water-cooled plant), Depressurized loss of forced circulation (D-LOFC, equivalent to a loss-of-coolant accident in a watercooled plant), and reactivity-initiated accidents (including failure to scram), peak fuel temperatures are below this 1600°C limit [18,19,[26][27][28].…”
Section: Hypothetical Accident Progressionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The postulated sequence of events considered in this PIRT exercise, based upon information available in literature [18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35], is thus as follows:…”
Section: Hypothetical Accident Progressionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Both oxidation and potential erosion of the graphite block by graphite dust can significantly degrade the surface-structure of the graphite component. The effect of such surface degradation on the strength and fracture toughness [25][26][27] is an important consideration in extrapolating the properties of test bars to component behavior in a reactor. c. The effects of cyclic [28] and static fatigue [29] in reducing the allowable operational stress should be incorporated in a thorough analysis.…”
Section: Limitationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ingress of larger amounts of water or steam into the primary circuit of RDE is seen to be an accident of considerable safety relevance. The two impacts of water to the graphite structures of core and fuel elements are: moderation and graphite corrosion effect [6,7]. The changing of the concentration moderated nuclei the neutron balance is affected and by chemical oxidation of the graphite the structural integrity of the core is attacked and explosive gases may be produced.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%