Fixing the Reference of Theoretical Terms

Nola, Robert

doi:10.1086/288954

Cited by 85 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…It is widely recognized that both purely descriptivist and purely causal theories of reference are insufficient to account for the reference of theoretical terms within the framework of SR (see for example Nola, 1980;Lewis, 1984;Psi los, 2012). In short, the reasons go like this: The reference of a theoretical term cannot be fixed ostensi ly, simply because there is nothing observa le to point at.…”

Section: Realism Reference and Modalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality

Borge

2016

Filosofia Unisinos

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Section: Realism Reference and Modalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality

Borge

2016

Filosofia Unisinos

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“…The view can be traced back to Evans (1973). Other notable proponents include Lewis (1984), Kroon (1987) and Nola (1980). Evans takes reference to be fixed by the dominant (causal) source of the speaker's descriptions.…”

Section: Causal-descriptivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Saving the intuitions: polylithic reference

Votsis¹

2009

Synthese

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My main aim in this paper is to clarify the concepts of referential success and of referential continuity that are so crucial to the scientific realism debate. I start by considering the three dominant theories of reference and the intuitions that motivate each of them. Since several intuitions cited in support of one theory conflict with intuitions cited in support of another something has to give way. The traditional policy has been to reject all intuitions that clash with a chosen theory. A more radical policy, tied to some experimental philosophers, has called for the rejection of any evidential role for intuitions. I explore a largely ignored third alternative, i.e. saving intuitions (and their evidential role) even when they are at odds. To accommodate conflicting intuitions different sets of internally consistent (yet externally inconsistent) intuitions are taken to lend credence to different concepts of reference. In the current context, this means that the concepts of referential success and referential continuity are not monolithic. They are what I call 'polylithic'. This paper is as much about meta-philosophical concerns with the role of intuitions as it is about reference and the scientific realism debate. Regarding the former I hope that a blueprint will emerge for similar projects in other philosophical domains. Regarding the latter, I hope that polylithicity helps disentangle claims about referential success and continuity in the scientific realism debate by making perspicuous which concepts are best equipped to evaluate the realist's epistemic claims against the historical record of science.

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“…Y en el caso de querer escapar de esas conclusiones, parece que no tenemos otra opción que admitir que al menos algunas descripciones teóricas están involucradas no solo en la fijación de la referencia de los términos teóricos. Esta objeción -sostenida en repetidas ocasiones por filósofos de la ciencia (Bird 2000 185;Kroon 1985;Niiniluoto 1999, 126;Nola 1980;Psillos 1999 280)-, fue formulada por primera vez por Enć:…”

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¿Soluciona el descriptivismo causal el problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos?

Borge¹

2017

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Las teorías de la referencia puramente descriptivistas o causales fracasan a la hora de dar cuenta del modo en que se fija y puede rastrearse la referencia de los términos teóricos. Psillos propuso dos versiones del descriptivismo causal que recogen argu-mentos presentes en defensas previas de dicha posición. Se trata de una teoría mixta que pretende solucionar el problema y acomodarse a intuiciones presentes en enfo-ques alternativos, como el que apela a oraciones de Ramsey. El artículo se propone mostrar la insuficiencia del descriptivismo causal como solución al problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos.

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Fixing the Reference of Theoretical Terms

Cited by 85 publications

References 8 publications

Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality

Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality

Saving the intuitions: polylithic reference

¿Soluciona el descriptivismo causal el problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos?

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