2016
DOI: 10.12688/wellcomeopenres.10298.1
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Fixing the stimulus-as-fixed-effect fallacy in task fMRI

Abstract: Most functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments record the brain’s responses to samples of stimulus materials (e.g., faces or words). Yet the statistical modeling approaches used in fMRI research universally fail to model stimulus variability in a manner that affords population generalization, meaning that researchers’ conclusions technically apply only to the precise stimuli used in each study, and cannot be generalized to new stimuli. A direct consequence of this stimulus-as-fixed-effect fallac… Show more

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Cited by 53 publications
(71 citation statements)
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“…This creates a tension: experimentalists use contrived stimuli and designs to recover elegant coding principles (e.g., Hubel & Wiesel, 1962); but it remains unclear whether these principles actually capture neural responses in naturalistic contexts (Felsen & Dan, 2005;Olshausen & Field, 2005;Hasson & Honey, 2012;Hamilton & Huth, 2018). From a statistical perspective, this tension is also partially reflected in anxiety about the "stimulus-as-fixed-effect" fallacy in psycholinguistics (Coleman, 1964;Clark, 1973;Baayen et al, 2008), social psychology (Brunswik, 1955;Wells & Windschitl, 1999;Judd et al, 2012), and cognitive neuroscience (Bedny et al, 2007;Westfall et al, 2016). Historically these practices and tensions can in part be traced to an argument from cognitive psychology that the brain is not exposed to rich enough data from the environment to navigate the problem space (Chomsky, 1965).…”
Section: Generalization Based On Impoverished Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This creates a tension: experimentalists use contrived stimuli and designs to recover elegant coding principles (e.g., Hubel & Wiesel, 1962); but it remains unclear whether these principles actually capture neural responses in naturalistic contexts (Felsen & Dan, 2005;Olshausen & Field, 2005;Hasson & Honey, 2012;Hamilton & Huth, 2018). From a statistical perspective, this tension is also partially reflected in anxiety about the "stimulus-as-fixed-effect" fallacy in psycholinguistics (Coleman, 1964;Clark, 1973;Baayen et al, 2008), social psychology (Brunswik, 1955;Wells & Windschitl, 1999;Judd et al, 2012), and cognitive neuroscience (Bedny et al, 2007;Westfall et al, 2016). Historically these practices and tensions can in part be traced to an argument from cognitive psychology that the brain is not exposed to rich enough data from the environment to navigate the problem space (Chomsky, 1965).…”
Section: Generalization Based On Impoverished Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note that such an item-wise approach differs from the typical method of assessing such 2 nd -order correlations between brain and model RDMs (Kriegeskorte and Kievit 2013;Clarke and Tyler 2014), which typically relate the entire item x item matrix at once, and thus generalize across all items that comprise the matrix, and furthermore do not explicitly assess the model fit or error associated with such a brain-behavior comparison. This more general approach therefore handicaps any attempt to capture both the predictive value of item-specific 2 nd -order similarity, as well as any attempt to capture the variation of model stimuli as a random effect (Westfall et al 2016), which we model explicitly below within the context of a mixed-effects logistic model across all subjects and items. Thus, the IRAFs for each visual and semantic RDM were used as predictors in a mixed-effects logistic regression analysis to predict subsequent memory [0,1] for items that were remembered in the conceptual but not the perceptual memory test (Conceptual Memory) vs. items that were remembered in the perceptual but not the conceptual memory test (Perceptual Memory).…”
Section: Identifying Brain Regions Where the Rdm-activity Fit (Iraf) mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Each regressor consisted of a single stick function (also known as a delta function or tent function) at the appropriate post-stimulus time, and was zero everywhere else, so that fitting the entire set of regressors modeled the time course of the response without any assumptions about its shape. As shown by the design matrix in Figure 1 In event-related fMRI, a single stimulus condition usually consists of presentation of multiple exemplars (for instance, a face, followed a few seconds later by a different face image, and so on); the deconvolved impulse response function represent the average response across all faces even though it is understood that individual stimuli evoke differing responses (Westfall et al, 2016). Our implementation of iEEG deconvolution is equivalent to this approach: the deconvolved visual, auditory, and interaction responses represent the average response across the four different word stimuli.…”
Section: Ieeg Data Analysis: Deconvolutionmentioning
confidence: 99%