Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck

Sartorio, Carolina

doi:10.1111/misp.12106

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The flicker strategy provides an important and intuitively forceful challenge to Frankfurt‐style cases and the threat they pose to PAP. Versions of the flicker defense that focus on the alternative possibility of agents omitting to make the relevant decisions on their own are particularly promising and continue to receive attention in the philosophical literature (see, e.g., Sartorio, 2019; Chevarie‐Cossette, 2021; Stockdale, 2022; Cyr, 2022; Haji, 2023). While contemporary critics of this strategy are generally willing to grant that this alternative possibility is one that cannot easily be eliminated from Frankfurt‐style cases, they resist claims that this alternative is sufficiently robust 18.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flickering the W‐Defense

Robinson

2023

Philosophical Issues

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One way to defend the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt‐style cases is to challenge the claim that agents in these scenarios are genuinely morally responsible for what they do. Alternatively, one can grant that agents are morally responsible for what they do in these cases but resist the idea that they could not have done otherwise. This latter strategy is known as the flicker defense of PAP. In an argument he calls the W‐Defense, David Widerker adopts the former approach. I argue that, while Widerker's argument does a poor job showing that these agents are not morally responsible for what they do, it does a very good job highlighting the alternative possibilities that remain open to agents in these cases and illustrating their moral significance (or robustness). In doing so, my aim is to co‐opt Widerker's argument to bolster the most promising versions of the flicker defense.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flickering the W‐Defense

Robinson

2023

Philosophical Issues

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“…If the latter, then the occurrence of the signals would not strictly foreclose possibility that the agents might act differently than indicated. Following that remain open to agents in Frankfurt-style cases are unable to do the work flicker strategists want them to do because they are insufficiently robust (Fischer 1994;McKenna 2003;Pereboom 2012;Sartorio 2019). The leading sentiment behind the robustness worry is the idea that, in order for it to be plausible that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities, as PAP maintains, this must be because moral responsibility requires alternatives of a certain sort-namely, alternatives that are morally significant in a way that could figure into an explanation of why an agent is morally responsible for what they did (i.e., robust).…”

Section: Self-inflicted Frankfurt-style Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Inflicted Frankfurt-Style Cases and Flickers of Freedom

Robinson

2023

J Ethics

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According to the most popular versions of the flicker defense, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) because agents in these cases are (directly) morally responsible not for making the decisions they make but for making these decisions on their own, which is something they could have avoided doing. Frankfurt defenders have primarily focused on trying to show that the alternative possibility of refraining from making the relevant decisions on their own is not a robust alternative, while generally granting that this alternative cannot easily be eliminated from successful cases of this sort. In a recent issue of this journal, Stockdale (2022) attempts to sidestep the debate concerning robustness and develops a novel kind of Frankfurt-style case in which agents are unable to avoid making the relevant decisions on their own. The fundamental problem with Stockdale’s argument is that it hinges on an implausible conception of acting on one’s own. I help clarify the pertinent sense of what it means to do a thing on one’s own in this context and show that these new cases are unable to overcome the targeted versions of the flicker defense of PAP.

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“…3) We might particularly worry that responsibility on this picture loses its bedrock. Responding to reasons is what is supposed to make it the case that we are responsible for our beliefs and actions in the first place (see Sartorio, 2019). I.e., it is not that agents ‘are responsible for the fact that their own reasons and deliberation brought about their decision ’, or indeed, their belief or action.…”

Section: Objection: Regressmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I.e., it is not that agents ‘are responsible for the fact that their own reasons and deliberation brought about their decision ’, or indeed, their belief or action. Rather, it is instead ‘that the agent is responsible for his decision because his own reasons and deliberation brought about his decision’ (Sartorio, 2019, p. 102). But, I do still think that responsibility is grounded in reasons responsiveness and in the capacity for deliberation; it's just that this capacity can turn inwards on itself.…”

Section: Objection: Regressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling our reasons

Keeling

2022

Nous

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Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting‐for‐a‐reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims seem especially untenable regarding believing for a reason. And extending the scope of control in this way also faces the threat of regress. In the face of this orthodoxy, the present paper argues that we do in fact have control over both believing and acting for a particular reason. It also starts to develop an account of the way in which this would be possible. Given the broad importance of understanding control and agency, this paper bears on a number of topics in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics.

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Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck

Cited by 7 publications

References 19 publications

Flickering the W‐Defense

Flickering the W‐Defense

Self-Inflicted Frankfurt-Style Cases and Flickers of Freedom

Controlling our reasons

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