Fluency and Feeling of Rightness

Abstract

Feeling of Rightness (FOR) is a metacognitive experience accompanying people's intuitive answers that predicts the probability of subsequently changing answers (Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). Previous research suggested FOR judgments are influenced by cues such as fluency, i.e., the ease with which an answer comes to mind. In the current paper, we examine the relationship between FOR, fluency, and answer changes; in particular, we were interested in whether answer fluency drives the effect of FOR on subsequent behaviours pertaining to answer changes. Reasoners (N = 64) in each of four experiments were asked to determine the validity of 32 syllogisms that consisted of single-model and multiple-model problems. In addition, each problem was randomly paired with a question containing either a high anchor value (80% or 90%) or a low anchor value (10% or 20%). In the first two experiments, reasoners then provided a FOR rating on a scale from 0 to 100 and indicated whether they would like to attempt to re-answer the question. The last two experiments served as the control experiments in which the FOR judgements were removed. The anchoring manipulation affected FOR judgments but not re-answer choices; it also did not affect answer fluency. Thus influencing FOR without affecting answer fluency had no effect on people's subsequent re-answer choices. In contrast, fluency was a reliable predictor of both FOR and re-answer choices. That is, when answers came to mind slowly, FORs were lower and people were more likely to choose to re-answer the problems. Thus, fluency appears to mediate the relationship between FOR and re-answer choices.

Influences of early diagnostic suggestions on clinical reasoning

“…This finding is in line with previous research on Feelings of Rightness (i.e. subjective confidence in an initial judgement) and resistance to changing one's mind (Thompson et al, 2013;Wang & Thompson, 2019). Previous research has also shown that confident initial judgments and first impressions are less likely to change in individual as well as in group decision-making (Kruglanski et al, 1993).…”

“…Previous research has also shown that confident initial judgments and first impressions are less likely to change in individual as well as in group decision-making (Kruglanski et al, 1993). Similar results have been found in a range of judgments, including consumer choices (Folke et al, 2017), syllogistic reasoning tasks (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006;Thompson et al, 2011Thompson et al, , 2013Wang & Thompson, 2019), medical diagnoses and treatment decisions (Dreiseitl & Binder, 2005;Jaimes et al, 2013;Krupat et al, 2017;Pandharipande et al, 2016), and moral dilemmas (Vega et al, 2020). The phenomenon is therefore not limited to lay people, but it is also applicable to experienced professionals.…”

Familiar Sequences Are Processed Faster Than Unfamiliar Sequences, Even When They Do Not Match the Count‐List

“…Instead, it is possible that faster processed sequences were judged as more familiar simply because they were more easily processed. This is because fluency is known to evoke a “feeling of rightness,” which can bias judgments (e.g., Thompson, Evans, & Campbell, 2016; Topolinski, 2012; Wang & Thompson, 2019). Accordingly, it is possible that ease of processing may mediate the association between familiarity judgments and response times.…”