Fluency misattribution and auditory hindsight bias

Abstract

We conducted three experiments to test the fluency-misattribution account of auditory hindsight bias. According to this account, prior exposure to a clearly presented auditory stimulus produces fluent (improved) processing of a distorted version of that stimulus, which results in participants mistakenly rating that item as easy to identify. In all experiments, participants in an exposure phase heard clearly spoken words zero, one, three, or six times. In the test phase, we examined auditory hindsight bias by manipulating whether participants heard a clear version of a target word just prior to hearing the distorted version of that word. Participants then estimated the ability of naïve peers to identify the distorted word. Auditory hindsight bias and the number of priming presentations during the exposure phase interacted underadditively in their prediction of participants' estimates: When no clear version of the target word appeared prior to the distorted version of that word in the test phase, participants identified target words more often the more frequently they heard the clear word in the exposure phase. Conversely, hearing a clear version of the target word at test produced similar estimates, regardless of the number of times participants heard clear versions of those words during the exposure phase. As per Roberts and Sternberg's (Attention and Performance XIV, pp. 611-653, 1993) additive factors logic, this finding suggests that both auditory hindsight bias and repetition priming contribute to a common process, which we propose involves a misattribution of processing fluency. We conclude that misattribution of fluency accounts for auditory hindsight bias.

Only Familiar Information is a “Curse”: Children’s Ability to Predict What Their Peers Know

“…Much debate exists over the specific cognitive mechanism that mediates the bias (e.g., Bernstein, Kumar, Masson, & Levitin, 2018; Pezzo, 2003, Pohl, 1998; Pohl, Bayen, Arnold, Auer, & Martin, 2018; Wasserman et al, 1991). We believe that the instances that do not result in the curse of knowledge are as theoretically informative (if not more informative) than instances that result in the curse of knowledge.…”

“…Researchers have also proposed fluency misattribution as a mechanism that contributes to the curse of knowledge. Researchers suggest that when information feels fluent (i.e., easy to process, easy to recall, or easy to integrate with our existing knowledge structures), we tend to think that this information is obvious to others (Bernstein et al, 2018; Birch et al, 2017; Harley et al, 2004). In other words, we misattribute the subjective ease associated with a piece of information to its objective ease, or foreseeability, to others.…”

“…Researchers have also put forth ‘sense making’ as a mechanism that leads to the curse of knowledge. When individuals can make sense of certain information (e.g., it fits with their knowledge structure), they are more likely to overestimate the apparentness of this information (e.g., Pezzo, 2003; see also, Bernstein et al, 2018, suggesting that fluency misattribution is a better account for the bias). On the other hand, if information is surprising, implausible, or does not make sense, researchers tend to find either no bias (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2007) or even a reversal of the bias (e.g., Yopchick & Kim, 2012).…”

“…Another potential limitation of the current work is that we did not directly measure fluency across experimental designs. A similar limitation exists in many experiments on fluency misattribution (e.g., Bernstein et al, 2018; Harley et al, 2004), whereby instead of measuring fluency directly, the work relies on the well‐documented observation that more familiar information is processed more fluently than less familiar information (e.g., Whittlesea, 1993). Nonetheless, future work could attempt to measure more directly the extent to which fluency is experienced by children and its relation to the magnitude of the curse of knowledge.…”

Perspective-taking and hindsight bias: When the target is oneself and/or a peer

“…Not only do individuals believe that their perspective-taking is shared with others as reflected in the commonality of hindsight knowledge (Bernstein et al, 2018 ; Birch et al, 2017 ; Higham et al, 2017 ; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989 ; Wood, 1978 ); they can overestimate it. Demonstrating the salience and influence of correct answers, Birch et al ( 2017 ) found participants who knew the correct answers overestimated the percentage of peers naïve to the answers who would answer correctly.…”