Fodor and the Inscrutability Problem

Abstract

In his 1993 Nicod Lectures, Jerry Fodor proposed a solution to a certain version of the problem of 'inscrutability of reference', which problem poses a challenge to a certain naturalistic, computational approach to cognition which Fodor has favoured. The problem is that purely informational accounts of an agent's mental contents cannot discriminate meanings finely enough. Fodor proposes a strategy of solution which appeals to the inferentiaI dispositions of agents to discriminate contents more finely. After a brief exposition of the problem and Fodor's bid for solution,

Fodor on Inscrutability

“…I then consider recent critiques of Fodor's proposal by Ray (1997) and Gates (1996). Contrary to some authors (e.g., Loewer, 1997) who assert that these critiques refute Fodor's proposal, I argue that neither critique succeeds.…”

“…An obvious objection is that not all languages contain predicate conjunction; for example, as Ray (1997) notes, classical first-order languages lack such operators. Fodor claims that the operator is present 'in English and every other language I've heard about ' (1994, p. 69), but this obviously doesn't imply the operator's availability in arbitrary target languages.…”

“…Greg Ray (1997) argues that Fodor's proposed solution to inscrutability fails because the target language will not always contain a test predicate that distinguishes two potential meanings: 'Why should we think that there will be a second predicate in any given mental language of the sort which Fodor's recipe tells us to find? So far as I can see, we have absolutely no reason to think that there will be such a predicate for all pairs of meaning theory contenders' (p. 484).…”

“…His proposal, combining elements of informational and inferential-role semantics, is to eliminate non-standard interpretations by testing predicate compatibility relations. I argue that Fodor's proposal, understood as primarily aimed at Mentalese, withstands Ray's (1997) and Gates's (1996) objections but nonetheless fails because of unwarranted assumptions about ontological homogeneity of target language predicates, and problems with Fodor's reliance on predicate conjunction to resolve ambiguity. Naturalized semantics thus remains without an answer to the inscrutability objection.…”