Fogelin’s Theory of Deep Disagreements: A Relativistic Reading

Abstract

In "The Logic of Deep Disagreements," Robert Fogelin claims that parties to a deep disagreement lack the common ground needed for arguments to work, making the disagreement impervious to rational resolution. Although Fogelin's article received numerous responses, there has been no attempt to elucidate the epistemological theory behind Fogelin's theses. In this article, I examine Fogelin's theory of deep disagreements in light of his broader philosophy. The picture that emerges is that of relativism of distance, a la Bernard Williams. By interpreting Fogelin's theory as relativism of distance, it avoids some of the critiques that have been raised against it. 1. For a useful overview, see Finocchiaro (2011).

Cognitive Peerhood, Epistemic Disdain, and Affective Polarisation: The Perils of Disagreeing Deeply

“…The literature on deep disagreements rarely tries to define the phenomenon. Rather, most authors offer characteristics that could serve as signposts to identify it, akin to a checklist of symptoms that could be used to diagnose a pathology (Ranalli, 2021;Lavorerio, 2021). Among these features, we find that deep disagreements are genuine in the sense that there is a proposition towards which the parties have conflicting doxastic attitudes.…”

“…But why do parties perceive each other as unresponsive to the evidence? Part of the answer is that they may not see everything that the other party presents as evidence as evidence (see Lavorerio 2020Lavorerio , 2021. This is because what counts as evidence is also in dispute in deep disagreements.…”

El Papel De La Ciencia en El Debate Público. La Objetividad Científica Desde El Modelo De Los Desacuerdos Profundosa

“…Parte de la reflexión acerca de los límites de este tipo de resolución, analizando más en profundidad la perspectiva de las partes involucradas. Para que sea aceptable una resolución relativista tienen que darse cuatro condiciones, que explícitamente deben ser aceptadas por ambas partes de la disputa: el valor de verdad de la proposición que cada uno de ellos defiende como posición en la disputa es un valor relativo, la posición de la otra parte es epistémicamente aceptable aunque no se considere que lleve a un valor de verdad compartido, a pesar de las dos condiciones anteriores cada parte se mantiene en su posición sin capitular y, por último, cada parte debe separar el conte-nido de la proposición de la perspectiva epistémica que la motiva y la justifica (Lavorerio 2021(Lavorerio , p. 1090. Lavorerio concluye que la resolución relativista no es tal, dado que estas condiciones no se cumplen en el caso en que se dan las tres condiciones de Hales.…”

“…Un mayor desarrollo de esta idea se encuentra enLavorerio (2020), en donde analiza y justifica por qué debe entenderse de este modo pues es coherente con la postura filosófica más amplia de Fogelin que se puede identificar en otros de sus trabajos.…”

The fundamental model of deep disagreements

“…Although Fogelin does talk of “framework propositions” as causing the disagreement's depth and he likely meant by the term something similar to what has come to be known as a “hinge commitment,” he does not endorse the view that deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge commitments. Instead, he suggests that deep disagreements are caused by the disputants’ participation in conflicting forms of life (see Lavorerio 2020).…”