Folk Mereology is Teleological

Abstract

When does mereological composition occur? For instance, if a paper plate is positioned on a table between a plastic knife and a metal fork, does this scattered plurality of diverse objects make up a single composite object (a 'table setting') or not? Or if two people shake hands, does this connected plurality of similar objects make up a single composite object (shaped like a sculpture of two people shaking hands) or not? In general, when does a collection of things form a whole? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view of composition that respects folk intuitions, and have charged leading views with failing on this score. For instance, Hirsch (2002: 60) declares that 'the linguistic evidence indicates that fluent speakers of English do not speak the mereologist's language. ' And Markosian (1998: 211) sets out from the claim that 'no one has yet defended a view . . . consistent with standard, pre-philosophical intuitions about the universe's composite objects. ' Yet there is widespread disagreement among metaphysicians as to what the folk intuit about mereological composition and why they do so, and no empirical discipline to the debate. We see this situation as an opportunity to put the tools of experimental philosophy to constructive use. Accordingly we aim to discover when the folk tend to think that composition occurs, and why they do so. So our question is: when do the folk think that mereological composition occurs? That is, what is folk mereology, against which metaphysical accounts of real mereology might be measured?Our question-beyond whatever intrinsic interest it might possess-should be of interest to anyone interested in the psychological question of how humans conceptualize the world, and in the connected project of descriptive metaphysics. Whether our question is also relevant to prescriptive metaphysics is controversial. For those who take conformity with folk intuitions to be at least one desideratum of theory choice in prescriptive metaphysics, our question bears obvious relevance. But even those who would dismiss folk intuitions as irrelevant to real metaphysics (either because they deny that intuitions should play any role, or because they deny that the intuitions of the folk should play any role) may still want to know what they would dismiss. Indeed, it seems to us that understanding folk mereology is a precondition to considering whether it deserves to be taken seriously.C 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.238

Persistence through function preservation

“…I then argued for a targeted debunking explanation of folk intuitions of material object persistence by arguing that the folk 27 Here I join Goldman (2007) and Paul (2010) in thinking that cognitive science can be useful to metaphysics. 28 In offering a targeted debunking explanation via an expertise defense for material object persistence, I am endorsing what Rose and Schaffer (2014) call the nuanced view: "the prospects for the expertise defense must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, in empirically disciplined ways" (p. 32; also see Rose and Danks, 2013) view is tied into a benighted view of nature (teleomentalism) and by offering an expertise defense in the specific case of persistence.…”

“…As expected there was no effect of ownership on persistence judgments (see Appendix). 14 Connected to this, Rose and Schaffer (2014) found no effect of contact or fusion, of familiarity or labeling or of quantifier restrictions on folk judgments of mereological composition. But they found a large, robust and persistent effect of function or purpose on folk judgments of mereological composition with the folk judging that composition occurred when the plurality had a purpose.…”

“…Similarly, Kelemen et al (2013) also found that even trained physical scientist show a similar pattern of reverting to unwarranted teleological explanations in similar conditions. Indeed, recent work by Rose and Schaffer (2014), investigating the role of teleological considerations in ordinary intuitions about mereological composition, provides evidence that the folk tend to intuit that a plurality has a fusion when the result has a purpose. In a wide range of cases, they found that the folk tended to judge that the plurality composed a further object when the result had a purpose and that the folk tended to judge that the plurality did not compose a further object when the result did not have a purpose.…”

“…Indeed, those who endorse the expertise defense often charge that the intuitions of the folk cannot be trusted since they cannot be relied on to understand the relevant concepts, draw salient distinctions and so forth. Only the intuitions of the philosopher, with her extensive experience in analyzing concepts, drawing salient distinctions and so forth, should be trusted (see e.g., Ludwig, 2007;Rose and Schaffer, 2014;Williamson, 2011). Given that professionals in the sciences and humanities in the Kelemen et al studies were not inclined to reflectively endorse scientifically illegitimate teleological explanations it seems that, in the case of persistence, we should expect philosophers to tend not to reflectively endorse teleological explanations of material object persistence.…”

Teleological Essentialism

“…Teleological thinking also plays a core role in our judgments about both existence and persistence. Rose and Schaffer () found that people tended to say that a collection of parts forms a whole when those parts serve a collective purpose. For example, they found that when an agent superglues some mice together, and the plurality of mice serve the function of detecting bombs, participants were significantly more inclined to think that the arrangement of mice composed a larger object in comparison to a case where mice were superglued together but had no function.…”