Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political Participation

Abstract

Using state-by-state voting data for U.S. presidential elections, the authors observe that voter turnout is a positive function of predicted closeness. To explain the strategic component of political participation, they develop a follow-the-leader model. Political leaders expend effort according to their chance of being pivotal, which depends on the expected closeness of the race (at both state and national levels) and how voters respond to their effort. Structural estimation supports this model. For example, a 1 percent increase in the predicted closeness at the state level stimulates leaders' efforts, which increases turnout by 0.34 percent.

The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout

“…Early rational choice work argued that close elections increase the chance that a single voter might become "pivotal" in determining the outcome, and thus increase voter turnout (Downs, 1957;Tullock, 1968;Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). However, after the realization that these pivotal voter theories predict vanishingly small turnout rates in large electorates (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985), several scholars-beginning with Morton (1987Morton ( , 1991 and Uhlaner (1989)-attempted to resolve the "paradox of voting" by focusing instead on the mobilizational efforts of politicians and interest groups (e.g., Cox and Munger, 1989;Aldrich, 1993;Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999). The basic argument is that elite actors in close races might rationally invest in mobilizing voters, while those voters might rationally respond to such mobilization by turning out to vote.…”

Voting as a signaling device

“…According to the ethical voting literature (Harsanyi 1980, Coate and Conlin 2004, Feddersen and Sandroni 2006 voters decide on the ground of moral principles and they derive utility from adhering to them. The leader-follower theories (Uhlaner 1989, Morton 1991, Shachar and Nalebuff 1999, Herrera and Martinelli 2006 emphasize the role of leaders and their ability to impose sanctions or to provide rewards in motivating social groups to participate in elections. Fowler (2005) argues that individuals imitate the voting behavior of their social circle, which can lead to turnout cascades.…”

Optimal Campaigning in Presidential Elections: The Probability of Being Florida

“…In Strömberg (2002b), I study voter participation. That paper adds political competition under the Electoral College to the model of Shachar and Nalebuff (1999). As these applications, and the discussion of the change to a Direct Vote system, show, the estimable probabilistic-voting model developed in this paper is very general and can be applied to a wide variety of electoral settings and questions.…”