Following the Money: Corruption, Conflict, and the Winners and Losers of Suburban Land Acquisition in China

Abstract

Land acquisition in suburban China is not merely the administrative means through which land is transferred from collectively owned rural land to state‐owned urban land; it is also a process of unlawful profit grabbing by rent‐seeking stakeholders. This licentiousness has been the source of intense controversy in recent years, becoming a major source of social unrest in contemporary China. Although standards of compensation are legally governed by strict policies, these standards are rarely followed as prescribed. As a result, we know very little about how revenue from land acquisition is shared in practice. This is because, as a contentious political issue rife with corrupt practices, accurate data are extremely difficult to obtain. This paper aims to address this vast empirical gap by tracing the flow of profit proliferation and distribution in a land acquisition case, using a suburban village in Shandong province, China, as an example. To expedite the drawn‐out acquisition process, the local government permits the corrupt behaviour of the village party secretary, who exploits his position to amass a great personal fortune. In contrast to previous research, which emphasises low compensation standards or excessive profit grabbing by local government, we find that villagers' protests are triggered by the corrupt practices of the village party secretary.

Sustainability of Land Use Promoted by Construction-to-Ecological Land Conversion: A Case Study of Shenzhen City, China

“…Rural-to-urban land conversion is a government practice in which the government converts communal land into state-owned land after payment of a land acquisition compensation fee using the land expropriation power and then develops the land in accordance with a construction land planning permit [48]. The essence of rural-to-urban land conversion is the allocation of land resources among different uses led by the government.…”

Age‐differentiated impact of land appropriation and resettlement on landless farmers: a case study of Xinghua village, China

“…The land appropriation experiences of Chinese landless farmers remains understudied, especially when compared to the large body of research conducted from the perspectives of the government (He et al , ; Lin et al , ; Lin & Ho, ; Lin & Zhang, ; Liu et al , ; Song et al , ; Wu et al , ; Xu et al , ; Zhang, ) and property developers (Lo & Wang, ; Pow, ; Shen & Wu, ). What is clear from these studies is that landless farmers are a disadvantaged group and obtain the least benefit from the appropriation process for several reasons: land requisition is crucial to government revenue; village‐level corruption is endemic; and there is little legal protection of property and land rights.…”

“…Compensation may be paid in the form of money and real properties (typically apartment units). Because this compensation is distributed first to village committees, and only then to affected farmers, there is widespread corruption among village leadership—now a primary source of social unrest in land appropriation (Song et al , ).…”

The Collective Strategies of Major Stakeholders in Land Expropriation: A Tripartite Game Analysis of Central Government, Local Governments, and Land-Lost Farmers

“…These issues are rooted deeply in the institutional, fiscal, and administrative frameworks of China [3]. Scholars have investigated the characteristics, causes, influences, and governance strategies of the conflicts during land expropriation [4][5][6][7][8][9][10].…”