Following Washington’s Script:

The Kosovo war and the Washington Post: Bombings and alignments

“…On 23 March 1999, US envoy Richard Holbrooke was in Belgrade to deliver a final ultimatum to Slobodan Milosevic: sign the Rambouillet Agreement or be bombed. Milosevic’s government refused to ratify the plan (Ackerman and Naureckas, 2000: 97). On the evening of 24 March 1999, following the commencement of Operation Allied Force, NATO Secretary General Solana said that President Milosevic ‘[had] refused to negotiate in good faith.’ And at a news conference on 1 April, he added:At Rambouillet, President Milosevic had a unique opportunity to settle this issue through negotiations and on the basis of a balanced and fair peace agreement.…”

“…Secretary of State Madeleine Albright presented her view on the Kosovo situation at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC on 4 February 1999. Her account was ‘filled with inversions, omissions and simplifications’ (Ackerman and Naureckas, 2000: 97). For example, she reversed the order of events leading up to President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic’s ‘brutal crackdown’ on Kosovo in 1998.…”

“… 11. ‘A high-level US official reportedly told journalists at Rambouillet: “We intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to comply. They need some bombing, and that’s what they are going to get”’ (Ackerman and Naureckas, 2000: 103). The Vice-President of Serbia Ratko Markovic led the Serbian delegation.…”

“… 6. As Wolfgram (2008b: 468) points out, ‘the roots of Albanian nationalism exist in a longer struggle with Serbs for control of Kosovo that stretches back well before the arrival of Slobodan Milošević in the mid-1980s.’ Moreover, ‘[i]t was the activities of ethnic-Albanian nationalists in driving Serbs out of Kosovo during the 1980s which allowed Milosevic to assume the mantle of protector of the Serbs’ (Hammond, 2007: 123; see also Ackerman and Naureckas, 2000: 98–99; Castan Pinos, 2019: 18–19). …”