For Queen and Company: The Role of Intelligence in the UK's Arms Trade

Abstract

This article analyses the role that the UK intelligence services (particularly Secret Intelligence Service [SIS or MI6], the Defence Intelligence Staff [DIS], Government Communication Headquarters [GCHQ] and associated agencies) play in the legal UK arms trade. The article shows that intelligence has been used in support of British‐based private commercial businesses, and occasionally in providing intelligence on the negotiating positions of rival manufacturers. This raises important questions about the role of the state in the private sphere, particularly the use of a large number of government assets in support of private interests and the elision of British government interests with those of a section of the manufacturing industry. This article also challenges existing conceptions of how the UK's intelligence agencies operate and relate to their customers. Conventional typologies of UK intelligence have emphasised the importance of the ‘central machinery’, highlighting the Joint Intelligence Committee as the focal point of intelligence tasking and analysis in the UK. However, in this case the intelligence support provided to the sale of military equipment suggests a range of parallel practices that are much more decentralised and often informal. This research therefore suggests that our conception of the UK intelligence architecture requires some reassessment.

Comparaison franco-britannique de la recherche sur les services de renseignement

“…Les travaux en cours de Robert Dover sur le rôle des services de renseignement dans la politique d'exportation d'armement du RoyaumeUni s'inscrivent aussi dans ce courant de recherche et devraient permettre de combler une lacune importante de la littérature sur la politique extérieure britannique (Dover, 2006(Dover, , 2007.…”

Europeanization of British Defence Policy

“…At that point there is evidence that the intelligence services, in particular, are tasked to conduct intelligence-led assessments of a project's commercial viability. A notable example of this happening is in the case of the Merlin hM K1 helicopter produced by GKn Westland in the late 1980s (Dover 2007). 4 The majority of evidence points towards the process being geared towards arms companies creating equipment and systems and then making a great effort through lobbying and back channels to influence government policy into requiring these products (tigner 2001).…”

“…The legal arms trade in Britain is viewed by government officials as being a core function of the state and an indispensable part of the British economy (Dover 2007). Moreover, the legal arms trade has foreign policy implications -the British government's view is that they can garner favour from third parties and exert insider advocacy over other countries foreign or domestic policy (DEso 2006).…”

“…British government assistance to manufacturers extends out to having the Defence Attaché and occasionally embassy officials present at the sales presentation to foreign government procurers (Dover 2007;scott 1996, c2.26). anecdotally, this is often a persuasive factor in any sales pitch -there is a badge of credibility carried by British officers because of the perceived quality of UK forces on active service and demonstrates the conflation of interests between the British government and arms manufacturers.…”

“…Between 25-40% of a Das time is spent on facilitating arms sales -including being directly tasked by DESO (something which is unique to the UK system) -this suggests arms sales are a significant part of the DA's role. Direct tasking from DESO is unique to the UK, however the use of Attachés in this role is quite commonly found in competitor European, russian and american governments (Dover 2007). the proximity of the manufacturer, MoD, DEso, and Das is partially illuminated through the MoD Defence attaché committee that decides on which countries should receive uK Das.…”