2011
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-011-9111-z
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Foreign aid and global governance: Buying Bretton Woods – the Swiss-bloc case

Abstract: Switzerland, Foreign aid, IMF, World Bank, Central Asia, Global governance, F33, F35, F5, F53, F55,

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Cited by 33 publications
(16 citation statements)
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“…Our first set of regressions focuses on recipient countries. 31 We estimate at the recipient-year level: (Vreeland 2011). We therefore compare the likelihood of a loan approval at the time the country holds a seat on the Board compared to the likelihood for the same country at other times.…”
Section: Recipient Levelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our first set of regressions focuses on recipient countries. 31 We estimate at the recipient-year level: (Vreeland 2011). We therefore compare the likelihood of a loan approval at the time the country holds a seat on the Board compared to the likelihood for the same country at other times.…”
Section: Recipient Levelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is often argued that the motivation of the donor country for giving aid (McGillivray 2003) and the type of aid given (Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani 2004; Minoiu and Reddy 2010) has an impact on its effectiveness. It has also been argued that some donors might be more effective in promoting growth than others if, for example, their aid is not given for strategic or commercial reasons (Kilby 2009, 2011; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a, b; Vreeland 2011; among many others).…”
Section: The Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…One reason for the limited effectiveness of foreign aid is the variation in donor characteristics. A large body of research demonstrates a general inclination of donors to provide more foreign aid to countries that are of economic, military, geopolitical interest to the donor or to buy votes in international organisations such as United Nations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000;Neumayer, 2003;Stone, 2011;Easterly and Pfutze, 2008;Kilby, 2009;Vreeland, 2011). Aid tends to be less effective when it is provided for strategic purposes (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008;Dreher et al, 2014;Minoiu and Reddy, 2010).…”
Section: Relationships Between Donor and Recipient Countriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Aid tends to be less effective when it is provided for strategic purposes (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008;Dreher et al, 2014;Minoiu and Reddy, 2010). Although multilateral aid institutions are generally considered to be less strategic in their foreign aid allocation (Neumayer, 2003;Headey, 2007;Dietrich, 2013), scholars point out that multilateral aid institutions can also exhibit biases due to the influence that powerful member states or coalitions with strategic interests (Vreeland, 2011;Stone, 2011;Cruz and Schneider, 2014).…”
Section: Relationships Between Donor and Recipient Countriesmentioning
confidence: 99%