Foreign Policy Change in Latin America: Exploring a Middle Range Concept

Abstract

This article examines patterns of change and continuity in Latin American foreign policies. It asks two interrelated questions: How can we conceptually and empirically account for foreign policy change? And why do states change their foreign policies in Latin America? To answer these questions, we used the results of a new expert survey on foreign policy preferences in the region between 1980 and 2014. The results we obtained using both linear and nonparametric specifications are very clear and consistent: presidential ideology is what matters the most. Simply put, a change in the ideology of the president produces a change in foreign policy that is almost equivalent in magnitude, all other theoretically relevant factors set to their means. En este artículo, examinamos los patrones de cambio y continuidad en las políticas exteriores de América Latina. Lo hacemos planteando dos preguntas relacionadas: ¿Cómo podemos dar cuenta conceptual y empíricamente del cambio en la política exterior? ¿Por qué los estados en América Latina cambian su política exterior? Para contestar estas preguntas, utilizamos los resultados de una nueva encuesta a expertos sobre las preferencias de política exterior entre 1980 y 2014. Los resultados obtenidos utilizando especificaciones lineales y no-paramétricas son claros y consistentes: la ideología presidencial es lo que más importa. Puesto de manera simple, un cambio en la ideología del presidente produce un cambio en la política exterior que es casi equivalente en su magnitud, ajustando todos los demás factores teóricamente relevantes a sus promedios.

Presidential Delegation to Foreign Ministries: A Study of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (1946–2015)

“…Our findings also add a twist to Merke et al (2020) claim that presidential ideology is the single most relevant factor behind foreign policy change in Latin America: apparently, this is more so when presidents are leftists, as they tend to lean less than right-wing leaders on status quo-biased bureaucracies.…”

“…This dovetails with Geddes's findings that Latin American presidential appointments are conditional on chief executives' political survival strategies (Geddes, 1994). To put it in other words, when Latin American presidents face political crises, they have incentives to politicise their bureaucratic appointments (Merke et al, 2020). Symmetrically, in periods of international stability, it becomes less costly for presidents to delegate to diplomats than in periods of international upheaval.…”

“…With few exceptions (such as Figueroa and Schiavon, 2014), comparative research on the relations between political leaders and professional diplomats in Latin America lies in limbo. The most we can say is that presidential ideology is the primary determinant of foreign policy change (Merke et al, 2020). But then, knowing whether presidents conduct foreign policy themselves or delegate it becomes crucial, as presidential ideology can get diluted, distorted, or even challenged in the delegation process.…”

International Clientelistic Networks: The Case of Venezuela at the United Nations General Assembly, 1999–2015

“…According to these authors, when it comes to foreign policy positions, left-wing governments, especially in Latin America, have moved away from the United States over the years. Riggirozzi and Grugel (2015), Merke et al (2020), and Wiesehomeier and Doyle (2012) note that changes in foreign policy behavior in Latin American countries under left-wing presidents also included supporting the reduction of inequalities worldwide, the criticism of liberal institutions, and a renewed discourse with an emphasis on national sovereignty. These claims are similar to Chávez's foreign policy principles, even if not displaying the same level of intensity and virulence; authors such as Levitsky and Roberts (2011) and Casta ñeda (2006) consider the Chavistas too radical as compared to other left-wing leaders.…”

O Brasil e o multilateralismo comercial: a política externa brasileira em relação à OMC entre 2003 e 2008

“…É interessante observar que para os autores "presidential instability and weak bureaucracies also seem to be relatively powerful predictors of FPCh [Foreign Policy Change], but are outshined by the effects of a change in the president's ideological persuasion" (MERKE; REYNOSO;SCHENONI, 2018, p. 23) . Tal argumento aponta para a importância da capacidade persuasiva do presidente e dialoga com trabalhos como os de Neustadt (2008) .…”