We describe a social-cognitive model explaining processing of cognitive dissonance resulting from being told by someone that a vividly remembered event did not actually occur. The model proposes that receiving challenges to one's recollection of events results in both intrapersonal and interpersonal cognitive dissonance. Rememberers process intrapersonal dissonance by weighing features of memory representations against the qualities of the feedback, and they process interpersonal elements by weighing the potential costs of agreeing or disagreeing with the challenger within the social dynamics of the relationship. To resolve the dissonance, people will either maintain or reduce belief in occurrence for the event, and will agree or disagree with the challenger. We explore factors that can influence dissonance and how they impact the rememberers' beliefs in occurrence of the event and their interaction with challengers in terms of defending or relinquishing their memory, and we discuss preliminary data confirming some of these factors. K E Y W O R D S autobiographical memory, cognitive dissonance and memory, disputed memories, memory and belief, nonbelieved memories, social influences on memory This article was submitted after Alan Scoboria passed away in April 2019. The model itself, the ideas, data collection and analyses, and initial draft were completed by him. Linda Henkel gave feedback on earlier drafts and concepts, and then she completed unfinished sections, created the graphic of the model, extended the literature review, and edited and finalized the manuscript, including responses to reviews. Thanks to Giuliana Mazzoni, Rob Nash, and Henry Otgaar for feedback and suggestions. May Alan's ideas continue to inform, intrigue, and inspire people for years to come.