Forgetting memory skepticism

Abstract

Memory skepticism alleges that our memory beliefs lack justification. 1 More precisely, the memory skeptic claims among other things that when we seem to remember that p, believing that p isn't justified. A central argument for memory skepticism attacks our justification for thinking the faculty of memory is epistemically trustworthy. Memory's epistemic trustworthiness has to do with this faculty functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. Epistemologists of various stripes will understand exactly what it is for memory to be epistemically trustworthy differently. Despite these differences, most have tended to focus on memory's reliability simpliciter-its tendency to produce a preponderance of true beliefs. 2 An interpretation we will focus on concerns instead mem-1 When we speak of "memory beliefs" we include all beliefs the contents of which we seem to remember. Whether or not such a belief constitutes a genuine or only an apparent memory is a further question. Importantly, "memory beliefs" doesn't just include beliefs with contents about the past. After all, one might believe and apparently remember that all dogs are mammals. Further, "memory beliefs" also includes any dispositional beliefs that one has, i.e., any belief that we would typically say is stored in one's memory.

Memory scepticism and the Pritchardean solution

“…In this way, Hasan argues that the reliability of my memory can be justified from the armchair, without relying on memory itself. This thought is also echoed by Frise and McCain (2021). Besides, Frise and McCain further argue that a sceptical argument based on K2 will be selfdefeating.…”

“…First, by 'memory knowledge', I mean the sort of knowledge constituted by 'memory beliefs'. Following Frise and McCain (2021), what I refer to as 'memory beliefs' are 'all beliefs the contents of which we seem to remember ' (2021: 253; emphasis in original). The emphasis on 'seem to' is not redundant, as it prevents us from taking a presumed stand unwisely on whether or not such a belief is supported by a genuine or only an apparent memory (in psychological terms, a 'true memory' or a 'false memory').…”

Memory belief is weak

“…Instead, I will attempt to advance the relevant debate by focusing on a specific type of belief, namely, (outright) memory belief. By ‘memory belief’, I mean beliefs formed on the basis of our memories, viz, all beliefs of which the contents are what we (seem to) remember (see also Frise & McCain, 2021, p. 253). By ‘memories’, unless otherwise noted, I refer to “propositional memory”, which is also known as “remembering‐that” (see Bernecker, 2010; Martin & Deutscher, 1966).…”