Formal Analysis and Implementation of a TPM 2.0-based Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme

Wesemeyer, Stephan; Newton, Christopher J. P.; Treharne, Helen; Chen, Liqun; Sasse, Ralf; Whitefield, Jorden

doi:10.1145/3320269.3372197

Cited by 23 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Such analyses can expose threats which can then be mitigated. Formal analysis has already been conducted for WebAuthn [16] and our experience of formally analysing direct anonymous attestation protocols will also be relevant [36]. Furthermore, a reference implementation of the architecture will also serve to promote discussion with industry.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Interoperable Architecture for Usable Password-Less Authentication

Casey¹,

Manulis

Newton

et al. 2020

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Passwords are the de facto standard for authentication despite their significant weaknesses. While businesses are currently focused on implementing multi-factor authentication to provide greater security, user adoption is still low. An alternative, WebAuthn, uses cryptographic key pairs to provide password-less authentication. WebAuthn has been standardised and is resilient to phishing attacks. However, its adoption is also very low; the barriers to adoption include usability and resilience of keys. We propose a novel architecture for password-less authentication designed to improve usability and deployability. Our architecture is based on the WebAuthn standards and supports registration and login to web-services. We support a WebAuthn authenticator that generates and uses the key pairs on the client device by providing resilience for these key pairs by using a backup key store in the cloud. We also propose a WebAuthn authenticator using a key store in the cloud so that passwordless authentication can be used interoperably between devices. We also assess the properties of these architectures against identified threats and how they can form the basis for improving usability and lowering the technical barriers to adoption of password-less authentication.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Interoperable Architecture for Usable Password-Less Authentication

Casey¹,

Manulis

Newton

et al. 2020

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…As TPM is a mature technology, vulnerabilities get fixed. Indeed, there have been several works that formally verify various aspects of the TPM standard [81][82][83]. We have not analyzed the timing channel of the runtime we have developed for security-critical programs.…”

Section: Security Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

A Personal Computer for a Distrustful World

Yao¹,

Talebi²,

Chen³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Personal computer owners often want to be able to run security-critical programs on the same machine as other untrusted and potentially malicious programs. While ostensibly trivial, this requires users to trust hardware and system software to correctly sandbox malicious programs, trust that is often misplaced. Our goal is to minimize the number and complexity of hardware and software components that a computer owner needs to trust to withstand adversarial inputs. We present a hardware design, called the split-trust machine model, which is composed of statically-partitioned, physically-isolated trust domains. We introduce a few simple, formally-verified hardware components to enable a program to gain provably exclusive and simultaneous access to both computation and I/O on a temporary basis. To manage this hardware, we present OctopOS, an OS composed of mutually distrustful subsystems.We present a prototype of this machine (hardware and OS) on a CPU-FPGA board and show that it incurs a small hardware cost compared to modern SoCs. For security-critical programs, we show that this machine significantly reduces the required trust compared to mainstream TEEs, and for normal programs, we show that it achieves similar performance as a legacy machine.

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“…Tamarin and SAPiC have already been used successfully for modelling TPM functionalities in existing works, e.g., [23,22,29], and they offer a convenient syntax for modelling protocols with global state. However, as mentioned above, it is rather challenging to model protocols with arbitrarily mutable global state, as it is required in the scenario presented in this paper.…”

Section: The Tamarin Prover and Sapicmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some notable examples in the context of the TPM are the works by Shao et al, which cover specific subsets of TPM functionalities, such as Enhanced Authorization (EA) [23] or HMAC authorization [22], identifying misuse cases. Also, Xi et al [30] and Wesemeyer et al [29] conduct formal analysis and verification of the the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol of the TPM. On the other hand, Delaune et al [10], propose a Horn-clause framework where they prove its soundness and use ProVerif to approximate the TPM internal state space, helping to address non-termination issues.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Root-of-Trust Abstractions for Symbolic Analysis: Application to Attestation Protocols

Fotiadis

Moreira

Giannetsos

et al. 2021

Security and Trust Management

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A key component in building trusted computing services is a highly secure anchor that serves as a Root-of-Trust (RoT). There are several works that conduct formal analysis on the security of such commodity RoTs (or parts of it), and also a few ones devoted to verifying the trusted computing service as a whole. However, most of the existing schemes try to verify security without differentiating the internal cryptography mechanisms of the underlying hardware token from the client application cryptography. This approach limits, to some extent, the reasoning that can be made about the level of assurance of the overall system by automated reasoning tools. In this work, we present a methodology that enables the use of formal verification tools towards verifying complex protocols using trusted computing. The focus is on reasoning about the overall application security, provided from the integration of the RoT services, and how these can translate to larger systems when the underlying cryptographic engine is considered perfectly secure. Using the Tamarin prover, we demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by instantiating it for a TPM-based remote attestation service, which is one of the core security services needed in today's increased attack landscape.

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Formal Analysis and Implementation of a TPM 2.0-based Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme

Cited by 23 publications

References 23 publications

An Interoperable Architecture for Usable Password-Less Authentication

An Interoperable Architecture for Usable Password-Less Authentication

A Personal Computer for a Distrustful World

Root-of-Trust Abstractions for Symbolic Analysis: Application to Attestation Protocols

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