2008 11th IEEE High Assurance Systems Engineering Symposium 2008
DOI: 10.1109/hase.2008.59
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Formal Support for Quantitative Analysis of Residual Risks in Safety-Critical Systems

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Cited by 8 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…It is noteworthy that most of the known risks threaten the system while they could be eliminated or controlled easily and by spending the minimum cost. However, the accidents resulted from them could impose huge losses on the system [17]. FMEA is applied in the industry at all stages of an industrial project from the manufacturing stage to the production stage to improve product quality and productivity [18].…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is noteworthy that most of the known risks threaten the system while they could be eliminated or controlled easily and by spending the minimum cost. However, the accidents resulted from them could impose huge losses on the system [17]. FMEA is applied in the industry at all stages of an industrial project from the manufacturing stage to the production stage to improve product quality and productivity [18].…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…SRoIE can be deduced through model checking which is widely used in SCS to verify whether system satisfies a specific constraint or not [7,8]. In model checking framework, the gathering environment and working environment can be constructed in SCS functional model, then the fault tolerant ability of the two environments can be analyzed respectively by equations (5) and (6).…”
Section: Sroie Algorithmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This scheme has been adopted well in Swedish strategic research foundation project and the national aerospace research program NFFP [3,4]. Elmqvist and Nadjm-Tehrani [5] improved the scheme to analyze residual risks quantitatively. Ying and Xu [6] extended the scheme from single and double faults mode to multiple faults mode.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The existing approaches are summarised in Figure V. From this comparison it becomes evident that only the approaches described in [11] and [13] use probabilistic model checking and support a probabilistic FMEA process. All other approaches work with traditional model checking tools.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…All other approaches work with traditional model checking tools. The novel aspect described in this paper with respect to the approaches in [11] and [13] is the support (generation and analysis) of counterexamples. These counterexamples provide valuable insights in the cause-consequence relationships between low level component failures and system level hazards.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%