2011
DOI: 10.1007/s11431-011-4562-2
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Formal verification of safety protocol in train control system

Abstract: In order to satisfy the safety-critical requirements, the train control system (TCS) often employs a layered safety communication protocol to provide reliable services. However, both description and verification of the safety protocols may be formidable due to the system complexity. In this paper, interface autómata (IA) are used to describe the safety service interface behaviors of safety communication protocol. A formal verification method is proposed to describe the safety communication protocols using IA a… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…In [29], the authors produce a formal description of safety communication protocols in train control systems TCS using interface automata and UML sequence diagrams. Deadlocks, live-locks, and some mandatory consistency properties of the proposed case study were checked by SPIN [16].…”
Section: Discussion and Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [29], the authors produce a formal description of safety communication protocols in train control systems TCS using interface automata and UML sequence diagrams. Deadlocks, live-locks, and some mandatory consistency properties of the proposed case study were checked by SPIN [16].…”
Section: Discussion and Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Related Work: Some past work has also looked at the EuroRadio protocol: Esposito et al [10] and Franekova et al [11] use UML, Zhang et al [18] use the SPIN model checker and Hongjie et al in [14] use Petrinets. However, all of these analyses only look at single runs of the protocol, they do not consider an active attacker, and they do not try to test the security properties we focus on in this paper, rather they look at general correctness issues such as deadlock detection.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The formal model was structured to retain the reusability and scalability properties of the system being studied. Zhang et al 14 proposed a formal verification method to describe the safety communication protocols using interface automata (IA). They translated IA model into PROMELA model so that the protocols could be verified by the model checker SPIN.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%