Formalising Fault Trees

Górski, Janusz; Wardziński, Andrzej

doi:10.1007/978-1-4471-3003-1_18

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…MATra fault trees further distinguish between Simple, Composed and Synchronisation event labels [9]. Here we concentrate on Simple events which are described by a subject entity and a condition; e.g., Valve • Stuck Open.…”

Section: Meta-models For Safety Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

On traceability for safety critical systems engineering

Mason

2005

12th Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference (APSEC'05)

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Traceability is the common term for mechanisms to record and navigate relationships between artifacts produced by systems development processes. It is especially vital for critical systems which must satisfy a range of functional and non-functional requirements, including safety, reliability and availability.Regulation normally requires critical systems are certified before entering service. This involves submission of a safety case -a reasoned argument and supporting evidence that such requirements have been met and that the system is acceptably safe.Safety engineers use a range of analysis techniques to gather evidence for a safety case. Most have tool support, although poor integration limits traceability between their respective data sets. This paper proposes a framework that enables links to be established and consistency maintained across data from disjoint safety analysis tools.

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Section: Meta-models For Safety Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

On traceability for safety critical systems engineering

Mason

2005

12th Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference (APSEC'05)

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“…Its application to Fault Tree Analysis was presented in [2]. The core of the formal model are the notions of event and action: E -set of events, whose elements are denoted X, Y, Z.…”

Section: Formal Model Of Eventsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our approach is based on the formal model of time dependent events introduced in [1] and the method of analysis of time dependent Fault Trees described in [2,3]. Our research focuses on improving this method and exploiting the results in a way that leads to disabling some scenarios of hazard occurrence.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hazard Prevention by Forced Time Constraints

Gołaszewski

Górski

2006

2006 International Conference on Dependability of Computer Systems

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Minimal cut sets resulting from Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) indicate basic events which, if occur together, can contribute to a hazard. For some applications we can extend event description with timing information and the hazard becomes enabled only if some particular timing relationships occur among the events of a given cut set. In this article we present how the timing information can be introduced to a Fault Tree and then exploited to identify additional timing requirements imposed on the controllable events of the system. Such requirements, if implemented, lead to the exclusion of some (otherwise feasible) scenarios of hazard occurrence.

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“…FFTA uses AND-gate to describe the system but OR-gate must be in the fault tree. This factor shows that a formalized FTA may not result in minimal cut set [6].…”

Section: B Formal Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Safety Analysis Techniques for Safety Critical Systems

Haider¹,

Nadeem²

2013

IJFCC

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Abstract-This paper is mainly focused on the study of the techniques available for the safety analysis of critical systems. It is never possible to build a completely safe system. There is a possibility to bring the behavior of these systems within acceptable limits. For safety evaluation of such systems both formal and informal techniques are available. Both techniques have their own prospects and consequences. Informal techniques are simpler to learn and easier to interpret and have more space for creativity and imagination of the analyst. Formal techniques due to their rigorousness ensure completeness. In this paper, we have analyzed both techniques after defining few parameters. Our study found it that formal techniques are better but usage of informal techniques can never be overlooked. Some approaches combine formal and informal techniques to reap the benefits of both. In some cases, informal techniques can be used as pre-requisite to narrow down the input of minimal critical set for formal techniques and reduce the effort required for formalization of the entire system.

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Formalising Fault Trees

Cited by 15 publications

References 2 publications

On traceability for safety critical systems engineering

On traceability for safety critical systems engineering

Hazard Prevention by Forced Time Constraints

A Survey of Safety Analysis Techniques for Safety Critical Systems

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