2018
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161996
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Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge

Abstract: How does the economy respond to news about future policies or future fundamentals? Standard practice assumes that agents have common knowledge of such news and face no uncertainty about how others will respond. Relaxing this assumption attenuates the general equilibrium effects of news and rationalizes a form of myopia at the aggregate level. We establish these insights within a class of games which nests, but is not limited to, the New Keynesian model. Our results help resolve the forward-guidance puzzle, off… Show more

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Cited by 268 publications
(164 citation statements)
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References 44 publications
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“…Our work also shows that the empirical impact of purely Odyssean shocks on output and prices is not excessively strong. This is consistent with recent models in which the impact of forward guidance is mitigated compared with its impact in the basic New Keynesian setup due to incomplete markets (McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson 2016), imperfect information and higher-order beliefs (Angeletos and Lian 2018), bounded rationality (Gabaix 2016), or bounded rationality combined with incomplete markets (Farhi and Werning forthcoming).…”
Section: Related Literaturesupporting
confidence: 89%
“…Our work also shows that the empirical impact of purely Odyssean shocks on output and prices is not excessively strong. This is consistent with recent models in which the impact of forward guidance is mitigated compared with its impact in the basic New Keynesian setup due to incomplete markets (McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson 2016), imperfect information and higher-order beliefs (Angeletos and Lian 2018), bounded rationality (Gabaix 2016), or bounded rationality combined with incomplete markets (Farhi and Werning forthcoming).…”
Section: Related Literaturesupporting
confidence: 89%
“…The fact that households do not adjust their expectations to a larger extent to information beyond one year provides empirical support to theories that model decision makers with limited capacity to collect and process information: e.g., limited planning horizons (Woodford 2018), bounded rationality (Gabaix 2019), level-k thinking (Farhi and Werning 2019), lack of common information (Angeletos and Lian 2018). While the exact micro foundations differ across studies, they share the feature that agents with limited abilities react less to information in the far future relative to information about the current and immediate future and hence possibly resolve the forward guidance puzzle.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 89%
“…Empirically, forward guidance appears to be less powerful than standard theory predicts, a phenomenon commonly referred to as the forward guidance puzzle (Del Negro et al 2015, D'Acunto et al 2019a. Recent theoretical attempts (e.g., Woodford 2018, Gabaix 2019, Farhi and Werning 2019, Angeletos and Lian 2018 at resolving this puzzle that emerges in a representative agent New Keynesian model propose deviations from rational expectations as a possible resolution. While the exact microfoundations differ, they all attribute an important role to some form of limited cognition on the part of the decision maker.…”
Section: Treatmentsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As argued in Schorfheide (2013), one of the key challenges in developing empirically-realistic 1 Recent contributions include Gabaix (2018), Garcia-Schmidt and Woodford (2019) and Farhi and Werning (2018), and Angeletos and Lian (2018). For a broader discussion of behavioral macroeconomics, see De Grauwe (2012).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This reflects both the endogenous persistence generated by agents' learning about their value functions as well as the reduced degree of forward-looking behavior associated with short-term planning horizons. Because of this model's ability to generate slow moving trends, its "goodness of fit" measure is substantially better than that of behavioral macro models of Angeletos and Lian (2018) and Gabaix (2018). Surprisingly, the FH model fit is nearly as good as the fit of a NK model that incorporates exogenous and separate trends in output, inflation, and interest rates.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%