2018
DOI: 10.17016/feds.2017.087r1
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Forward-looking and Incentive-compatible Operational Risk Capital Framework

Abstract: This paper proposes an alternative framework to set banks' operational risk capital, which allows for forward-looking assessments and limits gaming opportunities by relying on an incentive-compatible mechanism. This approach would improve upon the vulnerability to gaming of the AMA and the lack of risk-sensitivity of BCBS's new standardized approach for operational risk.JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32

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Cited by 3 publications
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