Foundations for contest success functions

Corchón, Luı́s C.; Dahm, Matthias

doi:10.1007/s00199-008-0425-x

Cited by 90 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…2 • 375-390 Greatly different from Zhou's (2004) model, this paper tries to borrow from Tullock's (1980) original idea to build a new model based on the stylized facts in China. The models of the contest success function have been well-developed and applied by many scholars (see, e.g., Skaperdas, 1996;Baik, 1998;Dasgupta and Nti, 1998;Rai and Sarin, 2009;Corchón and Dahm, 2010). In this paper, we will show that Tullock's conceptual framework can be used to construct an economic theory of the political promotion system in China.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 91%

An Economic Analysis of the Political Promotion System in China

Pi¹

2017

Zb.rad.Ekon.fak.Rij.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 91%

An Economic Analysis of the Political Promotion System in China

Pi¹

2017

Zb.rad.Ekon.fak.Rij.

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“…See for instance Tullock (1980), Nitzan (1994), Baharad and Nitzan (2008) for the CSF in (2) with η i = η j = 1 (which has been axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996)) and Gradstein (1995), Corchón (2007) and Corchón and Dahm (2010) for the general case with η i ≥ η j (axiomatized by Clark and Riis (1998)). …”

Section: Assumption 2 (Preferences)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests

Hoffmann

Kolmar

2017

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We analyze Nash equilibria of share and probabilistic contests when players have distributional preferences. If players are sufficiently similar, distributional preferences create multiple equilibria. For the case of only mildly heterogeneous players, equilibrium effort can be lower as well as higher than effort with standard, selfish preferences. These findings can explain three anomalies in empirical tests of the probabilistic prize-seeking game, namely the large variance of effort levels (overspreading), individual spending that exceeds the Nashequilibrium prediction (overspending), and aggregate spending that exceeds the value of the prize (overdissipation), and they are also in line with the findings for share contests. If players are sufficiently heterogeneous, the game has a unique equilibrium that is more egalitarian than the standard, selfish Nash equilibrium. It turns out that the less talented competitor may win the larger share of the prize if his inequality aversion is sufficiently strong. We analyze how the equilibria evolve if the number of players gets larger and how sequential moves influence behavior. Two new insights follow from the analysis of the sequential-move game. First, sequential moves act as a coordination device if there are multiple simultaneous equilibria, and second the inequality aversion of the more egalitarian player can be used as a commitment device for low effort. This effect can reverse the conventional wisdom that the underdog should lead. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: D030, D720, D740.

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“…5 Analyzing a game with two rent-seekers, Corchón and Dahm (2010) show that some contest success functions can be derived as a utility-maximizing choice from a setting in which rent-seekers are uncertain about the type of politician. Corchón and Dahm (2011) derive contest success functions without the commitment assumption.…”

Section: Lobbies Buy Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy

2012

Self Cite

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This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district where voters or their representative support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, so each legislator who seeks the firm's investment votes for the policy, though all legislators would be better off if they all voted against the policy. And when votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible. Unlike influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes, the behavior considered is time consistent and in line with the low campaign contributions by special interests.

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Foundations for contest success functions

Cited by 90 publications

References 33 publications

An Economic Analysis of the Political Promotion System in China

An Economic Analysis of the Political Promotion System in China

Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests

How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy

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