2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) 2016
DOI: 10.1109/eurosp.2016.28
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Foundations of Hardware-Based Attested Computation and Application to SGX

Abstract: Exciting new capabilities of modern trusted hardware technologies allow for the execution of arbitrary code within environments completely isolated from the rest of the system and provide cryptographic mechanisms for securely reporting on these executions to remote parties.Rigorously proving security of protocols that rely on this type of hardware faces two obstacles. The first is to develop models appropriate for the induced trust assumptions (e.g., what is the correct notion of a party when the peer one wish… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
1

Citation Types

1
84
0

Year Published

2016
2016
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
6
1

Relationship

3
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 44 publications
(85 citation statements)
references
References 27 publications
1
84
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Our machine model is heavily inspired from [23]. We define a machine as a computing abstraction with memory, central processing unit and input and output devices, capable of running interactive programs.…”
Section: Machines Programs and Processesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our machine model is heavily inspired from [23]. We define a machine as a computing abstraction with memory, central processing unit and input and output devices, capable of running interactive programs.…”
Section: Machines Programs and Processesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…with the right parties all interacting with the same IEE). We take inspiration from the recent work of Barbosa et al [3] who provide a formalization for the notion of attested computation that can convince a party that its local view of the interaction with a remote IEE matches what actually occurred remotely. This guarantee is close to the one that we need, but it is unfortunately insufficient.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our implementation of a generic MPC protocol -sgx-mpcrelies on the NaCl 4 cryptographic library [9] and inherits its careful approach to dealing with timing side-channels. We discuss side-channels in SGX-like systems and explain 3 We use schemes which satisfy the additional notion of minimal leakage which ensures that the outsourced instrumented program P * reveals no information about its internal state beyond what the normal input/output behavior of the original program P would reveal. 4 https://nacl.cr.yp.to 3 how our constant-time code thwarts all leaks based on control-flow or memory access patterns that depend on secret data.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations