Four challenges to Confucian virtue ethics in technology

Abstract

Purpose As interest in technology ethics is increasing, so is the interest in bringing schools of ethics from non-Western philosophical traditions to the field, particularly when it comes to information and communication technology. In light of this development and recent publications that result from it, this paper aims to present responds critically to recent work on Confucian virtue ethics (CVE) and technology. Design/methodology/approach Four critiques are presented as theoretical challenges to CVE in technology, claiming that current literature insufficiently addresses: overall applicability, collective ethics issues, epistemic overconfidence within technology corporations and amplification of epistemic overconfidence by the implementation of CVE. These challenges make use of general CVE literature and work on technology critique, political philosophy, epistemology and business ethics. Findings Implementing CVE in technology may yield some benefits, but these may be outweighed by other outcomes, include strengthening hierarchies, widening inequities, increasing, rather than limiting, predictive activity, personal data collection, misinformation, privacy violations and challenges to the democratic process. Originality/value Though not directly advocating against CVE, the paper reveals hitherto unidentified and serious issues that should be addressed before CVE are used to inform ethics guidelines or regulatory policies. It also serves as a foundation for further inquiry into how Eastern philosophy more broadly can inform technology ethics in the West.

Mapping the ethic‐theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence research

“…Kantar and Bynum (2021, p. 329) discuss the notion of “flourishing ethics” and argue that it may be regarded as an “umbrella” that incorporates Western viewpoints as well as “additional ethical ideas from cultures of the world (for example, Buddhist, Muslim, Confucianist cultures and others)”. Bay's (2021) exploration of Confucian Virtue Ethics in technology warns of its potential limitations but also proffers that future valuable work could be performed through the utilization of other Eastern philosophical positions such as Daoism and Mohism. Jecker, Atiure and Ajei (2022, p. 33) present an account of the reasoning and results of social robots, and argue that one that is governed by ubuntu (humanness) captures “important insights … that many Western accounts miss.”…”