Four steps to avoid a synthetic-biology disaster

Dana, G.; Kuiken, Todd A.; Rejeski, David; Snow, Allison A.

doi:10.1038/483029a

Cited by 94 publications

(67 citation statements)

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“…Of course, there is nothing to guarantee that health-oriented bioengineering will be done with the world's safety in mind, or that 'technical vectors' will be sufficient for avoiding adverse outcomes, no matter how small the risks presently appear (Bennett et al 2009). For this reason, experimental research to assess and mitigate potential risks associated with large-scale biotechnology deployment will be crucial for ensuring that engineering and process controls to safeguard health and the environment advance alongside other developments in synthetic biology (Gutmann and Wagner 2010;Dana et al 2012).…”

Section: Research Agendas For Global Healthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design-driven, multi-use research agendas to enable applied synthetic biology for global health

Carothers

2013

Syst Synth Biol

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Many of the synthetic biological devices, pathways and systems that can be engineered are multi-use, in the sense that they could be used both for commerciallyimportant applications and to help meet global health needs. The on-going development of models and simulation tools for assembling component parts into functionally-complex devices and systems will enable successful engineering with much less trial-and-error experimentation and laboratory infrastructure. As illustrations, I draw upon recent examples from my own work and the broader Keasling research group at the University of California Berkeley and the Joint BioEnergy Institute, of which I was formerly a part. By combining multi-use synthetic biology research agendas with advanced computer-aided design tool creation, it may be possible to more rapidly engineer safe and effective synthetic biology technologies that help address a wide range of global health problems.

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Section: Research Agendas For Global Healthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design-driven, multi-use research agendas to enable applied synthetic biology for global health

Carothers

2013

Syst Synth Biol

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“…Scientists must realize that for some proposed realworld synthetic biology applications, the benefits of their O. Wright, G.-B. Stan and T. Ellis deployment may never outweigh the perceived risks, which range from genetic pollution via HGT of innocuous synthetic genes through to the dual-use of technologies by those intent on causing harm (Dana et al, 2012;Hoffman et al, 2012). In working towards future applications of GMMs, researchers therefore should not only aim to incorporate biosafety mechanisms into their designs to help alleviate potential risks, but should also seek to engage stakeholders and regulators, who will ultimately decide how safe is safe-enough (Bhattachary et al, 2010;Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, 2010).…”

Section: Now and The Futurementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The majority of research and development in synthetic biology has utilized microbes as the host cells, which, in comparison with multicellular organisms, are more rapid to engineer and easier to understand. As synthetic biology advances, however, concerns are being raised about adverse effects that synthetic microbes may have if more broadly used or released into the environment (Dana et al, 2012;Moe-Behrens et al, 2013). Could genetically modified microbes (GMMs) outcompete native species and disrupt habitats?…”

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confidence: 99%

Building-in biosafety for synthetic biology

2013

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As the field of synthetic biology develops, real-world applications are moving from the realms of ideas and laboratory-confined research towards implementation. A pressing concern, particularly with microbial systems, is that self-replicating re-engineered cells may produce undesired consequences if they escape or overwhelm their intended environment. To address this biosafety issue, multiple mechanisms for constraining microbial replication and horizontal gene transfer have been proposed. These include the use of host-construct dependencies such as toxin-antitoxin pairs, conditional plasmid replication or the requirement for a specific metabolite to be present for cellular function. While refactoring of the existing genetic code or tailoring of orthogonal systems, e.g. xeno nucleic acids, offers future promise of more stringent 'firewalls' between natural and synthetic cells, here we focus on what can be achieved using existing technology. The state-ofthe-art in designing for biosafety is summarized and general recommendations are made (e.g. short environmental retention times) for current synthetic biology projects to better isolate themselves against potentially negative impacts. IntroductionSynthetic biology aims to design, model and apply modular whole-cell systems to provide solutions to various challenges (Khalil & Collins, 2010). Real-world applications of synthetic biology range from molecular biosynthesis in enclosed bioreactors (Martin et al., 2003) through to sensing and acting upon external cues during environmental release, such as for biosensors (French et al., 2011), bioremediation (Singh et al., 2011) and biomining (Brune &Bayer, 2012). The majority of research and development in synthetic biology has utilized microbes as the host cells, which, in comparison with multicellular organisms, are more rapid to engineer and easier to understand. As synthetic biology advances, however, concerns are being raised about adverse effects that synthetic microbes may have if more broadly used or released into the environment (Dana et al., 2012;Moe-Behrens et al., 2013). Could genetically modified microbes (GMMs) outcompete native species and disrupt habitats? Could altered or synthetic genetic material escape its host and contaminate indigenous organisms?These concerns echo old questions raised previously by the introduction of recombinant DNA technology (Berg & Singer, 1995). At the 1975 Asilomar conference, scientists agreed on a cautious approach, incorporating both physical and biological containment into experimental design to minimize environmental risks that cisgenics or transgenics may pose (i.e. sequences native to the host, or to another species, respectively) (Berg et al., 1975). Four decades later, these principles have so far ensured no significant disaster (Berg & Singer, 1995;Benner & Sismour, 2005). Following the recent demonstration of a working synthetic genome (Gibson et al., 2010), a high-profile review has reaffirmed that the same caution applies to the use of 'syngenic' material, i.e. no...

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“…[140]), a growing coalition of civil society organizations calls for a moratorium on the release and commercial use of synthetic organisms and the creation of new international regulations to govern the synthetic genomics/biology sector [141]. Others argue for significant public funding of ecological risks research on synthetic organisms and close cooperation between ecologists and synthetic biology researchers [142].…”

Section: New Benefits New Risks New Govern-ance?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Synthetic Genomics and Synthetic Biology Applications Between Hopes and Concerns

König¹,

Frank²,

Heil³

et al. 2013

Current Genomics

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New organisms and biological systems designed to satisfy human needs are among the aims of synthetic genomics and synthetic biology. Synthetic biology seeks to model and construct biological components, functions and organisms that do not exist in nature or to redesign existing biological systems to perform new functions. Synthetic genomics, on the other hand, encompasses technologies for the generation of chemically-synthesized whole genomes or larger parts of genomes, allowing to simultaneously engineer a myriad of changes to the genetic material of organisms. Engineering complex functions or new organisms in synthetic biology are thus progressively becoming dependent on and converging with synthetic genomics. While applications from both areas have been predicted to offer great benefits by making possible new drugs, renewable chemicals or clean energy, they have also given rise to concerns about new safety, environmental and socio-economic risks -stirring an increasingly polarizing debate. Here we intend to provide an overview on recent progress in biomedical and biotechnological applications of synthetic genomics and synthetic biology as well as on arguments and evidence related to their possible benefits, risks and governance implications.

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Four steps to avoid a synthetic-biology disaster

Cited by 94 publications

References 0 publications

Design-driven, multi-use research agendas to enable applied synthetic biology for global health

Design-driven, multi-use research agendas to enable applied synthetic biology for global health

Building-in biosafety for synthetic biology

Synthetic Genomics and Synthetic Biology Applications Between Hopes and Concerns

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