We present a two-state practical quantum bit commitment protocol, the security of which is based on the current technological limitations, namely the non-existence of either stable long-term quantum memories, or non-demolition measurements. For an optical realization of the protocol, we model the errors, which occur due to the noise and equipment (source, fibers and detectors) imperfections, accumulated during emission, transmission and measurement of photons. The optical part is modeled as a combination of a depolarizing channel (white noise), unitary evolution (e.g. systematic rotation of the polarization axis of photons) and two other basis-dependent channels, the phase-and the bit-flip channels. We analyze quantitatively the effects of noise using two common information-theoretic measures of probability distribution distinguishability: the fidelity and the relative entropy. In particular, we discuss the optimal cheating strategy and show that it is always advantageous for a cheating agent to add some amount of white noise -the particular effect not being present in standard quantum security protocols. We also analyze the protocol's security when the use of (im)perfect non-demolition measurements and noisy/bounded quantum memories are allowed. Finally, we discuss errors occurring due to a finite detector efficiency, dark counts and imperfect single-photon sources and show to have the same effects as those of standard quantum cryptography.