1993
DOI: 10.1016/0039-3681(93)90023-d
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Four ways of eliminating mind from teleology

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…5. As if teleology: function talk in biology is merely metaphorical (Woodfield, 1976;Nissen, 1993;Schaffner, 1993: chapter 8, Ruse, 2002. This idea is usually traced back to the famous German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1790).…”
Section: Teleologymentioning
confidence: 98%
“…5. As if teleology: function talk in biology is merely metaphorical (Woodfield, 1976;Nissen, 1993;Schaffner, 1993: chapter 8, Ruse, 2002. This idea is usually traced back to the famous German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1790).…”
Section: Teleologymentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Some pieces of evidence appear to support this story. For instance, Kant in his time did not even consider any non-intentional accounts of teleological terms (2000/1790); C. J. Ducasse claimed in 1925 that "it follows from this definition of purposiveness that only the acts of entities capable of belief and desire, are capable of being purposive, and therefore that the occurrences of 'inanimate nature' cannot be spoken of as purposive without contradiction, unless belief and desire be injected into nature…" (p. 154); and even in Wright's time, there were still several philosophers who considered only intentional accounts to be legitimate (Taylor 1950;Woodfield 1976;Nissen 1993;1997). Overall, this question is empirical in nature and goes far beyond the concern of the present article.…”
Section: A Unified Account Of Eliminativismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, Nissen is not an eliminativist himself(Nissen, 1993). Being no eliminativist, insisting on the intentional account of function, and understanding well that in most cases biology does not deal with intentions, Nissen concludes finally that the presence of function terms in biological discourse "remains controversial," (p. 48) and also urges us to accept this limited conclusion.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%