Fragile Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China's Industrial Pollution Law

Abstract

Official statistics and independent survey data show that in the last decade China has witnessed a remarkable change in its enforcement of environmental pollution violations, moving toward more formalistic and coercive law enforcement with more enforcement cases as well as higher fines. The data also show that there is considerable regional variation with coastal areas having more and higher punishments than those inland. This article explores these findings, seeking to understand the explanation and meaning of these temporal and regional variation patterns. The study shows how enforcement varies when there is a convergence of governmental, social, and economic institutional forces. The article argues that the basis for such convergence has been fragile, as national pressures have lacked consistency and local community and government support evaporates when dominant sources of income are at stake.

Green chemistry and green engineering in China: drivers, policies and barriers to innovation

“…In Jiangsu Province, in Southeastern China, there is an extensive system of remote monitoring, and severe penalties are incurred by firms whose waste emissions exceed authorized levels. This began in 2008, though a professor who has been involved with the provincial government in the province reports that there is a great deal of manipulation by local towns, and the results remain uncertain (Professor, Nanjing University of Technology, 2008;Van Rooij and Lo, 2010). This is still more advanced than the western provinces, where the main concern is still the large level of poverty, and development projects in these areas still have priority.…”

“…This is still more advanced than the western provinces, where the main concern is still the large level of poverty, and development projects in these areas still have priority. Additionally, monitoring and enforcement standards are not as rigorous (Van Rooij and Lo, 2010).…”

“…This is a challenge not just for green chemistry and green engineering per se, but also for the underlying environmental regulations that can be important drivers. Because of the competing priorities facing any bureaucracy, environmental enforcement across China has been very uneven (Van Rooij and Lo, 2010). While some provinces have become stricter, others are considerably more lax.…”

Why small and medium chemical companies continue to pose severe environmental risks in rural China

“…Although in principle firms that failed to comply with environmental regulations risked incurring noncompliance penalties and revoking of their operating permits (Weng and Lin, 2011;Smallbone and Welter, 2001), in the practice of rural China application remains limited. Especially in the case of pollution from "key protected firms" local enforcement was powerless due to dependence on the local government (Wang et al, 2008;Van Rooij and Lo, 2010;Stevens et al, 2013), and the career paths of Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) leaders (Kostka, 2013;Liu et al, 2012). Pressures from higher level governments and agencies, the public, and international economic relations, put pressure on the lax chemical risk management through a closed and protective relationship of local governments and SMEs.…”

A fragmented environmental state? Analysing spatial compliance patterns for the case of transparency legislation in China

“…Ample regulatory space between vague national laws and detailed local implementation guidelines, for instance, allows local governments to hollow out the spirit and guiding principles of environmental regulation. The literature refers to this implementation gap as ''local protectionism'' because it is assumed that lower government ranks resist national legislation to protect their own economic interests (Van Rooij 2006;Van Rooij and LO 2010). Local governments might even engage in state corroding activities (Cai and Treisman 2004).…”