Fragmented Layering: Building a Green State for Mining in Peru

Opposition Tactics on the Implementation of Advocacy-Driven Institutional Reforms: A Study of Mining Environmental Assesment in Peru

“…Chile, for example, implemented glacier legislation to manage these concerns (Cortez and Maillet, 2018;Haslam, 2018), while El Salvador enforced a mining ban (Spalding, 2018). Peru established the Ministry of the Environment and The Agency for Environmetal Assesment and Enforcement (OEFA) (Orihuela and Paredes, 2017), and many other countries have undertaken reforms related to Indigenous free, prior, and informed consent (Schilling-Vacaflor et al, 2018;Wright and Tomaselli, 2019).…”

“…While many Latin American countries had already established environmental assessment institutions led by their respective environmental ministries to enhance state independence from sectors like mining, agriculture, and manufacturing, the Peruvian state resisted this institutional trend until the very end. Instead, it chose to maintain selfregulating control of environmental assessment within these productive sectors (Orihuela and Paredes, 2017). The eventual reforms entailed the creation of the Ministry of the Environment (MINAM) and the Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA) in 2008, and the subsequent transfer of responsibility for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) from producing ministries, such as the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM), to the National Environmental Certification Service for Sustainable Investments (SENACE) in 2015.…”

“…These advocacy efforts involved diverse and coordinated campaigns that spanned multiple scales, supported by civil society actors and strategic institutional alliances (Kirsch, 2014;Silva, 2015;Delamaza, 2019;Delamaza et al, 2017). Furthermore, these multiscalar ACN campaigns played a significant role in creating opportunities for environmental reforms to take shape (Orihuela and Paredes, 2017). The transformative shifts in public opinion at both national and international levels produced the 'boomerang effect' on national governments, as described by Keck and Sikkink (1998).…”

Conflict in collective forest tenure: Lessons for Peru from a comparative study

“…In Peru, Huamaní et al (2012) have argued that conflict management institutions particularly suffer from this disarticulation, and that there is a shortage of government specialists to manage conflict. A government report found that the inadequate response of public entities was one of the main causes of conflicts in the Amazon region (PCM, 2018), and scholars in Peru agree that the high level of conflict is due in large part to the low institutional capacity for conflict management (Tanaka 2011;Huamaní et al 2012;Orihuela and Paredes 2017).…”

Los conflictos en la tenencia forestal colectiva: Lecciones para Perú de un estudio comparativo

“…En Perú, Huamaní et al (2012) han argumentado que las instituciones de manejo de conflictos padecen especialmente de desarticulación, y que existe escasez de especialistas del gobierno para manejar conflictos. Un reporte gubernamental encontró que la respuesta inadecuada de las entidades públicas fue una de las causas principales de conflicto en la región amazónica (PCM 2018), y académicos en Perú concuerdan con que el alto nivel de conflictos se debe en gran parte a la limitada capacidad institucional para el manejo de conflictos (Tanaka 2011;Huamaní et al 2012;Orihuela y Paredes 2017).…”