Framing biosecurity: an alternative to the biotech revolution model?

Abstract

Since 11 September 2001 there is growing national and international policy focus on the increasing threat of bioterrorism. Underpinning this policy focus is a dominant frame of discourse for how to consider biosecurity threats. This paper describes some of the key ideas comprising the dominant biosecurity discourse and contrasts it with an alternative framing of the issues. To illustrate these different frames, it draws on examples from the emerging field of synthetic genomes and other biotechnologies that have generated security concerns. It argues that the current dominant frame takes away attention from other important considerations for assessing the threat from biotechnologies.

Dual-use research and the H5N1 bird flu: Is restricting publication the solution to biosecurity issues?

“…By focusing on the ease of diffusion of knowledge and technologies, socio-technical aspects of biotechnology such as tacit knowledge, complexity and contingency are overlooked and possible challenges are disregarded, thus leading to the perception of an increased threat (Vogel 2008). Moreover, relying on this linear model of technical change may lead to a false prioritization of policy measures and an inappropriate focus on high-tech research (McLeish and Nightingale 2007;Vogel 2008;Leitenberg 1999). …”

“…Tucker (2011) andVogel (2008) are among the few who have highlighted the importance of tacit knowledge used by life scientists during experimentation. In the context of life science research, Tucker (2011) defines 'tacit knowledge' as knowledge:…”

“…It involved members of the Wimmer group who published the first de novo synthesis of a virus (Cello et al 2002;Vogel 2008). The group revealed that the most difficult part of the poliovirus synthesis was not the partially automated DNA synthesis.…”

“…. require specialized laboratory know-how and practices only obtained by training, care, and attention to detail [and are difficult even for experienced researchers] (Vogel 2008). That the reconstruction or recovery of a pathogen would currently require someone 'skilled in the art' has been supported by other experts including the NSABB Working Group on Synthetic Genomics.…”

“…A more flexible perspective on dual-use technology and 'dangerous science' is needed to ensure that policy measures keep up with the rapid developments in life science research and secure the benefits of academic research. This different perspective on the development of life science research and its impact on the dual-use debate has been discussed amongst sociologists (McLeish and Nightingale 2007;Vogel 2008;Tucker 2011). However, it has not yet found its way into the public debate over dual-use research.…”