Framing consensus

Abstract

International territorial conflicts are frequently characterized by political recourse to narratives of nationalist entitlement, stifling conflict resolution by raising domestic audience costs and discursively limiting bargaining flexibility. Conflict incentivizes elite employment of such claims precisely because security threats and fear of violence heighten popular resonance of adversarial collective identity frames. This article argues, however, that consensus mobilization behind nationalist territorial claims is highly dependent upon the particular narratives elites select to justify them. Employing controlled individual-level experiments administered to diverse populations in Israel, it demonstrates how exposure to competing narratives of homeland, security, economic prosperity, and settlement impacts support for control of East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. Although indivisible claims to ‘United Jerusalem’, the Golan, and West Bank settlement blocs and strategic highlands are generally considered popular consensus issues in Israel, only particular narratives trigger consensus mobilization behind each. Some narratives even encourage conciliatory policy attitudes against such appeals. As a democracy embroiled in multiple enduring territorial disputes, analysis of the Israeli case contributes to understanding of the limits and political consequences of elite rhetoric. Demonstrating the affinity between narrative frames and popular policy preferences, this article also lends insight into the intersubjective beliefs that drive mass support for nationalist territorial claims.

Domestic Distributional Roots of National Interest

“…For example, Zellman (2018) finds in his study of the Serbian public that intangible framings do not always engender stronger feelings for reclaiming lost territory than do economic framings. Second, intangibility is often hard to objectively measure because even the same object can hold multiple meanings for different people depending on their ideology, pocketbook considerations, and framing of the dispute (Shelef 2015;Tanaka 2016;Zellman 2015).…”

“…However, while leader cues would certainly influence public opinion, a leader-driven approach cannot tell the full story. Leaders are often criticized for backing down in conflicts or for escalating unnecessarily (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017;Tomz 2007), and their attempts to frame an issue as important or unimportant are not always successful (Druckman 2001;Krebs 2015;Zellman 2015). In fact, leaders do not enjoy a completely free hand in portraying issues as national interests even in many authoritarian regimes (Li and Chen 2021;Weeks 2012).…”

Fighting from the Pulpit: Religious Leaders and Violent Conflict in Israel

“…Rather, this need should be stronger for conflicts that involve territory with high symbolic value that is perceived as indivisible (Manekin, Grossman, and Mitts 2017). In contrast, they should be less likely to attach religious value to territory which only contains strategic value (Zellman 2015). This suggests the following hypothesis:…”