Fraud Motives and Opportunities Factors on Earnings Manipulations

Noor, Nurul Fitri Mohd; Sanusia, Zuraidah Mohd; Heang, Lee Teck; Iskandar, Takiah Mohd; Isa, Yusarina Mat

doi:10.1016/s2212-5671(15)01091-6

Cited by 19 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The finding supports Noor et al (2015) that audit independence has negative correlation to earnings management. It also supports Bell et al (2015) state that tenure determines the audit quality and the finding in Korea that big N auditor will reduce stock price crash risk for IFRS adopting companies (Lim et al, 2016).…”

Section: Hypothesis Resultssupporting

confidence: 71%

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The Type I Versus Type II Agency Conflict on Earnings Management

Nurim

Sunardi

Raharti

2017

JDM

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This study aims to detect the background of earnings management behavior in which it shows the tendency of type I or II agency conflict. The high ownership concentration of firms in Indonesia leads type II agency conflict, but the good corporate governance formulation assumes conflict between management and shareholders. This study uses published data in IDX from [2009][2010][2011][2012][2013][2014]. TThe result reveals that reputation quality has negative significant correlation to earnings management behaviors, but corporate governance quality has insignificant correlation to earnings management, except percentage of independent commissioner board in moderate level. It has implication that management faces type II agency conflict. The majority may monitor management directly, so the finding reveals that independent commissioner board' s function is not optimum as part of corporate governance mechanism. According to the evidence, corporate governance formulation, especially in Indonesia, should be needed for reducing earnings management on type II tendency. Info Article

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Section: Hypothesis Resultssupporting

confidence: 71%

“…Audit independence has negative correlation to earnings management (Noor et al, 2015). However, the finding of Haw et al (2011) and Persakis and Iatridis (2016) require the investor protection for optimizing the audit quality mechanism in corporate governance implementation.…”

Section: The Auditor Qualitymentioning

confidence: 96%

The Type I Versus Type II Agency Conflict on Earnings Management

Nurim

Sunardi

Raharti

2017

JDM

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“…The motivations and incentives for profit management are firstly opportunistic motivation in order to achieve selfmanagement benefits; profit management has a material impact on the company's true position. After that, efficiency Motivation is the motivation is efficiency when influencing users financial statements and accounting information by showing the company to achieve a balance between return and risk, in order to ensure the survival of the company in the competitive market [26]. Then, contractual incentives for profit management are when the contract between the company and the other parties is based on accounting results; managers have an incentive to manage profits.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Study Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Earnings Management and Corporate Governance Evidence from Jordanian Banks

Shubita*

2020

IJRTE

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The board of directors typically selects and removes officers, initiates fundamental changes, determines capital structure, adds, amends, or repeals bylaws (such as mergers and divestitures), declares dividends and sets the compensation for officers and management. The segregation of duties involves assigning different employees to perform functions so that an employee acting alone is prevented from committing an error or concealing a fraud in the normal course of their duties. Four types of functional responsibilities should be segregated: the authority to execute transactions, the recording of transactions, custody of the assets affected by the transactions and periodic reconciliation of existing assets to recorded amounts. There are several studies on the influence of corporate governance in developed markets relating to a variety of aspects. However, in the context of the Jordan market, such researches are rare. The paper analyses the governance practices of 13 Jordanian listed banks listed. The main findings of the study are that there is a positive relationship between board sizes and earnings management (EM) through discretionary accruals, that there is no relationship between independence and segregation of duties, and that EM through discretionary accruals and board size mediates the association between corporate governance structure and (EM) through discretionary accruals.

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“…Pada perusahaan perbankan di Tunisia, kebijakan dividen justru tidak mempengaruhi praktik manajemen laba secara signifikan karena pembagian dividen pada perusahaan perbankan bukan faktor yang signfikan bagi pemegang saham. Pemegang saham cenderung menggunakan kelebihan dana untuk ekspansi bank daripada dibagikan dalam bentuk dividen (Isahak et al, 2011;Tong dan Miao, 2011;Lin et al, 2014;Noor et al, 2015;Charfeddine et al, 2013;He et al, 2015;dan Costa et al, 2016;Abaoub et al, 2013).…”

Section: Pendahuluan Latar Belakangunclassified

Analisis Perilaku Oportunistik, Mekanisme Pengawasan Dan Manajemen Laba Pada Perbankan Konvensional Indonesia

Ramli

Joe

2019

JMIEB

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Tujuan penelitian adalah untuk menganalisis pengaruh perilaku oportunistik (diproksikan leverage dan kebijakan dividen) dan mekanisme pengawasan (yang diproksikan dengan kualitas audit dan inkonsistensi informasi) terhadap manajemen laba. Populasi yang dijadikan obyek penelitian berjumlah 43 perusahaan perbankan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada tahun 2010-2016. Penelitian ini menggunakan data panel dengan jumlah data observasi sebanyak 70. Data sekunder diolah dengan metode structural equation model dengan pendekatan partial least square. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa leverage dan kebijakan dividen merupakan perilaku oportunistik yang mempengaruhi positif signifikan terhadap manajemen laba. Kualitas audit dan inkonsistensi informasi nonkeuangan berhubungan positif dengan mekanisme pengawasan. Mekanisme pengawasan beserta indikatornya mempengaruhi positif signifikan terhadap manajemen laba pada bank umum konvensional. The purpose of this study is to analyze the predictive effect of opportunistic behavior (proxied by leverage and dividend policy) and monitoring mechanism (proxied by audit quality and inconsistency of nonfinancial information) on earnings management. Population of this reseacrh taken as the object of observation amounted to 43 banking firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 2010 - 2016. This research is using panel data with total data amounted to 70 firm-years observation. Secondary data is processed with structural equation model method with partial least square approach. The result showed leverage and dividend policy are opportunistic behaviours that impact positively and significant on earnings management. Audit quality and inconsistency of nonfinancial information are significant indicators of monitoring mechanism. Monitoring mechanism and its indicators have positive and significant impact on earnings management in Conventional Commercial Banks.

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Fraud Motives and Opportunities Factors on Earnings Manipulations

Cited by 19 publications

References 23 publications

The Type I Versus Type II Agency Conflict on Earnings Management

The Type I Versus Type II Agency Conflict on Earnings Management

Earnings Management and Corporate Governance Evidence from Jordanian Banks

Analisis Perilaku Oportunistik, Mekanisme Pengawasan Dan Manajemen Laba Pada Perbankan Konvensional Indonesia

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