Free intermediation in resource transmission

Han, Lining; Juárez, Rubén

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.006

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These models often place markets on a multipartite graph, where edges represent two agents being capable of trade with one another, and the agents play a specific role in buyer-seller interactions possibly facilitated by intermediaries, e.g. [4,6,12,19,20]. Kakade et al [22] introduced a generalization of the AD exchange model to a graphical setting, enabling a robust set of interactions between agents on an arbitrary set of goods which is lacking in other economic models on networks.…”

Section: Relevance To the Economic Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Graphical Economies with Resale

Andrade

Frongillo

Gorokhovsky

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Kakade, Kearns, and Ortiz (KKO) introduce a graph-theoretic generalization of the classic Arrow-Debreu (AD) exchange economy. Despite its appeal as a networked version of AD, we argue that the KKO model is too local, in the sense that goods cannot travel more than one hop through the network. We introduce an alternative model in which agents may purchase goods on credit in order to resell them. In contrast to KKO, our model allows for long-range trade, and yields equilibria in more settings than KKO, including sparse endowments. Our model smoothly interpolates between the KKO and AD equilibrium concepts: we recover KKO when the resale capacity is zero, and recover AD when it is suciently large. We give general equilibrium existence results, and an auction-based algorithm to compute approximate equilibria when agent utilities satisfy the weak gross-substitutes property.CCS Concepts: • Theory of computation → Exact and approximate computation of equilibria; Market equilibria; Network games.

show abstract

Section: Relevance To the Economic Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Graphical Economies with Resale

Andrade

Frongillo

Gorokhovsky

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This fairness-related constraint is known as stand-alone core stability and is the primary design constraint in the minimum cost spanning tree problem [10] and a variety of other problems. 1 See [8] for more POAs of different classes of functions such as the quadratic, M/M/1 delay functions and M/G/1 delay functions. 2 The average cost mechanism has been used successfully in a variety of network problems, e.g., [2,11].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks

Juárez

2019

Games

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of connecting a large number of atomless agents in a network. The centralized agency elicits the target nodes that agents want to connect, and charges agents based on their demands. We look for a cost-sharing mechanism that satisfies three desirable properties: efficiency which charges agents based on the minimum total cost of connecting them in a network, stand-alone core stability which requires charging agents not more than the cost of connecting by themselves directly, and limit routing-proofness which prevents agents from profitable reporting as several agents connecting from A to C to B instead of A to B. We show that these three properties are not always compatible for any set of cost functions and demands. However, when these properties are compatible, a new egalitarian mechanism is shown to satisfy them. When the properties are not compatible, we find a rule that meets stand-alone core stability, limit routing-proofness and minimizes the budget deficit.

show abstract