2006
DOI: 10.1080/00856400600550799
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Freedom and its enemies: The politics of transition in West Bengal, 1947–1949*

Abstract: South Asia: Journal of South Asian StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

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Cited by 3 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Partition and its memories of 1947 in West Bengal are thus chronicled with empathy in contemporary historiography and similar texts (Chakrabarti 1999;Chatterji 2001;Chakrabarty 1995;Sengupta 2003). By June 1948, there were about 1.1 million refugees in West Bengal (Bandyopadhyay 2006). Only due to the fact that they had accommodation in Calcutta did the families of my parents not land up in a squatter or refugee colony.…”
Section: Partition and Displacement: Militancy Beyond Domesticmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Partition and its memories of 1947 in West Bengal are thus chronicled with empathy in contemporary historiography and similar texts (Chakrabarti 1999;Chatterji 2001;Chakrabarty 1995;Sengupta 2003). By June 1948, there were about 1.1 million refugees in West Bengal (Bandyopadhyay 2006). Only due to the fact that they had accommodation in Calcutta did the families of my parents not land up in a squatter or refugee colony.…”
Section: Partition and Displacement: Militancy Beyond Domesticmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Her memory of the members of the party as essentially educated, middle class, and coming from elitist (banedi/abhijata) backgrounds corroborates the narratives of historical documents. The communist party in Bengal started with a predominantly educated middle class or bhadralok (respectable/well-mannered/ decent folk) base (Bandyopadhyay 2006) with elitism at least in terms of its leadership (Franda 1971). Never being openly antagonistic to the Congress (Sen 1972), trying and failing to unite the Congress and the Muslim League before and after the communal riots of 1946 (Mahajan 2000), voting against and failing to resist the partition (Lahiri 2001), the party began to organize the villages by raising demands for abolition of the zamindary system without compensation, redistribution of land, fair wages for agricultural laborers, and of course the demand for tebhaga for the sharecroppers.…”
Section: Partition and Displacement: Militancy Beyond Domesticmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Through their unions and in their workplaces they continued to battle against retrenchment, restrictive labour policy, and enforced arbitration throughout the period of independence. 24 The immediate aftermath of the Second World War saw the most intense spell of strike action Indian industry had ever known. Increasing food prices, the scarcity of basic commodities, and a fall in real wages fed stories of corruption, black marketing, and hoarding across the country.…”
Section: O P P O S I T I O N I N T H E F I R S T Y E a R O F T H E C mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When the Hindu Mahasabha started a campaign for the partition of Bengal in early 1947 , they opposed it, but could not actively resist it. The two communist leaders in the Bengal Legislative Assembly-Jyoti Basu and Ratanlal Brahman-voted against the Partition resolution, but that did not count for anything (Bandyopadhyay 2001). When 'freedom' came with Partition, the communists were hardly in a mood to rejoice, as the veteran communist leader Abani Lahiri (2001) told us in an interview with historian Ranajit Dasgupta.…”
Section: Communism In Bengalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…And an oppressive procurement policy followed by the new government, desperately trying to handle urban food shortages, put the peasant producers in a tight position, as most of them were hardly producing any surpluses beyond their subsistence needs. It was this situation that the CPI leadership interpreted as the revolutionary potential and sought to capitalise on these grievances of the people which the Congress government failed to deal with because of their inefficiency and wrong policies (for details, see Bandyopadhyay 2006).…”
Section: The Working Class and Peasant Militancymentioning
confidence: 99%