Freedom and trying: Understanding agent-causal exertions

Griffith, Meghan

doi:10.1007/bf02866208

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…This version of libertarianism is the most common. All non-causal (Goetz 1988, Ginet 1990, McCann 1998, Lowe 2008, Pink 2004) and agent-causal theories (Chisholm 1966, Taylor 1992, Griffith 2007, Steward 2012 fall into this group. (I know about only one exception.…”

Section: Standard Versionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience

Feltz¹,

Missal²,

Sims³

2020

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Section: Standard Versionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience

Feltz¹,

Missal²,

Sims³

2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This version of libertarianism is the most common. All non-causal (Goetz 1988, Ginet 1990, McCann 1998, Lowe 2008, Pink 2004) and agent-causal theories (Chisholm 1966, Taylor 1992, O'Connor 2000, Clarke 2003, Griffith 2007, Steward 2012 fall into this group. (I know about only one exception.…”

Section: Standard Versions Most Libertarians Claim That Decisions As mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Libet-Style Experiments Cannot Refute All Forms of Libertarianism

Bernáth¹

2019

Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience

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“…If similar constraints apply to efforts, such discussions may prove highly relevant for determining the limits of what one can strive for.Third, the concept of trying has also received important attention within practical philosophy. In moral philosophy, Griffith (2007) has recently argued that trying is the locus of freedom and responsibility; Scheler (1973a) suggests in various places that strivings are the primary bearers of moral values. One also finds a vast literature within the philosophy of law and legal studies about the penal status of attempts (see notably Duff, 1996).…”

Section: Research On Effort: An Interdisciplinary Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a definition of efforts.

Massin¹

2017

Motivation Science

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Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept of effort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for an explicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at this definition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1 presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and argues that few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues that such a definition is now needed and proposes a basic methodology to arrive at it, whose first step is to make explicit the various tacit assumptions about effort made across sciences and ordinary thinking. Section 3 unearths 4 different conceptions of effort from research on effort so far: primitive-feelings accounts, comparator-based accounts, resource-based accounts and force-based accounts. It is then argued that the first 2 kinds of accounts, although interesting in their own right, are not strictly speaking about effort. Section 4 considers the 2 most promising general approaches to efforts: resource-based and force-based accounts. It argues that these accounts are not only compatible but actually extensionally equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains why force-based accounts should be regarded are more fundamental than resource-based accounts.

show abstract

Freedom and trying: Understanding agent-causal exertions

Cited by 7 publications

References 11 publications

Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience

Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience

Why Libet-Style Experiments Cannot Refute All Forms of Libertarianism

Towards a definition of efforts.

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