Freedom, Power and Interference: An Experiment on Decision Rights

Neri, Claudia; Rommeswinkel, Hendrik

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2485107

Cited by 8 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…For instance, Fehr et al (2013) and Bartling et al (2014) find that principals value a lottery presented in a delegation context more than the equivalent lottery presented in a neutral framework. Neri and Rommeswinkel (2014) also find that principals have a preference for keeping decision rights that is not fully captured in the material value that can be obtained by them, and show further that this preference is driven primarily by the principal's desire to prevent the agent from influencing his outcome. These findings agree with previous evidence (discussed below) of individuals responding negatively to being controlled.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 75%

Enhancing Autonomy to Motivate Effort: An Experiment on the Delegation of Contract Choice

Chaudhry¹,

Klinowski²

2016

Research in Experimental Economics

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We investigate whether giving workers autonomy through delegation of contract choice intrinsically motivates effort. In a novel laboratory experiment that controls for contract preferences and outcomes, principals can either choose the contract under which agents work on a real-effort task, or delegate the contract choice to the agents. We evaluate whether agents exert higher effort when they are allowed to choose the contract versus when the contract is imposed on them. We find no difference between the two conditions, even after controlling for baseline ability and for locus of control. Because our design excludes the possibility that preferences play a role, and because workers engaged in a real-effort task, this result casts doubt on an intrinsic link between the autonomy granted through delegation and the motivation of employees in the workplace. Our results do not deny, however, the possible instrumental benefits of autonomy (which did not play a role in our design) and their potentially powerful impact on motivation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 75%

Enhancing Autonomy to Motivate Effort: An Experiment on the Delegation of Contract Choice

Chaudhry¹,

Klinowski²

2016

Research in Experimental Economics

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“…By now, also a growing strand of experimental literature indicates that individuals intrinsically value decision rights (e.g. Bartling et al, 2014;Ferreira et al, 2020;Neri and Rommeswinkel, 2017).…”

Section: List Of Symbolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the economic value of decision rights: An experimental test

Meemann

2023

SSRN Journal

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“…The empirical evidence in the literature mingles the assumed productivity effect of autonomy with the benefits of preference matching. Deci and Ryan (2000), Ryan and Deci (2017), Frey (1997), Dickinson and Villeval (2008), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Fehr et al (2013), and Neri and Rommeswinkel (2017), among others, have shown in experimental and field work that individuals have a higher intrinsic motivation and persistence in the performance of a task, when they are granted autonomy in choosing it. The authors' experimental manipulations, however, not only affect the subjects' experience of autonomy, but also restrict them in choosing according to their true preferences.…”

Section: Experiments 2: Why Autonomy Improves Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Self‐nudging contracts and the positive effects of autonomy—Analyzing the prospect of behavioral self‐management

Tontrup

Sprigman

2022

J Empirical Legal Studies

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Nudging interventions typically presume some asymmetry of sophistication and power between the choice architect and the nudged. But the nudged need not be relegated to a passive role. We present evidence that individuals have a capacity to counter their biases, and even to use them to their advantage. This capacity for behavioral self‐management (“BSM”) can allow them to act as the choice architects of their future‐self. In our study, we provide participants with the autonomy to choose among a variety of loss‐ and gain‐framed contracts that govern the terms under which they perform a real effort task. The results show that subjects strategically harness their own loss aversion to counter their present bias and significantly improve their performance. The loss‐framed contracts give individuals a tool they can use to self‐nudge. This possibility of self‐nudging should widen our perspective on biases. Biases can cause cognitive error and dampen motivation, but they can also be a valuable tool for individual decision making. And giving subjects the autonomy to choose their favored contract adds to the effectiveness of their BSM strategy. We show that subjects' experience self‐determination utility separate from performance benefits driven by a better adjustment of work tasks to subjects' production functions. To demonstrate the policy relevance of our results, we expand on an application of BSM strategies to retirement savings plans, which we suggest may lift participation and savings rates at no additional cost.

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Freedom, Power and Interference: An Experiment on Decision Rights

Cited by 8 publications

References 41 publications

Enhancing Autonomy to Motivate Effort: An Experiment on the Delegation of Contract Choice

Enhancing Autonomy to Motivate Effort: An Experiment on the Delegation of Contract Choice

On the economic value of decision rights: An experimental test

Self‐nudging contracts and the positive effects of autonomy—Analyzing the prospect of behavioral self‐management

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