Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth

Textor, Mark

doi:10.1093/mind/fzq041

Cited by 26 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…This means that grasping a thought itself is not taking a propositional attitude toward the thought. For this point, see Textor (2010).…”

Section: The A-theory Reading Of Frege's Conception Of Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Frege's Conception of Truth: Two Readings

Kim¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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The object reading of Frege's conception of truth holds that, for him, truth is an object-the truth-value the True. Greimann refutes the object reading and suggests an alternative reading. According to his suggested reading, Frege is a proponent of the assertion theory of truth, the main thesis of which is that truth is what is expressed by the form of assertoric sentences, and truth as such is neither an object nor a property. I argue that Frege cannot accept the assertion theory. I also defend the object reading by elaborating it further and replying to Greimann's criticisms.

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“…This means that grasping a thought itself is not taking a propositional attitude toward the thought. For this point, see Textor (2010).…”

Section: The A-theory Reading Of Frege's Conception Of Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Frege's Conception of Truth: Two Readings

Kim¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…We can also think of these as prescriptions for making judgements; we must comply with them in our judgements if we are not to fail of the truth” (Frege, , p. 145). For more discussion about Frege's use of the term “truth” to characterize the goal of thinking, see, for example, Textor () and Evnine's unpublished “Frege on the Relation Between Logic and Thought”.…”

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confidence: 99%

Frege on Anti‐Psychologism and the Role of Logic in Thinking

Lockhart

2016

Theoria

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According to (what I call) the Explanatory Problem with Frege's Platonism about Thoughts, the sharp separation between the psychological and the logical on which Frege famously insists is too sharp, leaving Frege no resources to show how it could be legitimate to invoke logical laws in an explanation of our activities of thinking. I argue that there is room in Frege's philosophy for such justificatory explanations. To see how, we need first to understand correctly the lesson of Frege's attack on psychologism as fundamentally marking a contrast between justification and explanation, and, second, we must take Frege to be committed to the idea that the laws of truth are normatively constitutive for the process of thinking. 303 FREGE, PSYCHOLOGISM, AND THE ACTIVITY OF THINKING 2 I do not think there need be any peculiar "we" who ask such questions. Ordinary people often ask why somebody believes something. Very often, such a question is answered by offering a justification. This I take to be ordinary, uncontroversial, but (I shall argue) within a Fregean framework, perplexing.

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“…See Textor: ‘The laws of truth themselves do not govern judgement and inference directly; prescriptions for correct judgement do. The connection between the laws of truth and these prescriptions is direct’ (617).…”

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“…According to Textor, ‘Frege is too optimistic: the prescriptions for correct judging cannot be read off from the laws of truth’ (617), so the relation between logical laws and judgement/inference cannot be a direct one. The idea that the laws of logic set forth direct prescriptions for thinking has been famously criticised by Gilbert Harman.…”

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confidence: 99%

Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought I

Mezzadri¹

2015

Philosophy Compass

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This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege's philosophy of logic. In Section 1 of Part I, I discuss Frege's view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking and is therefore a normative science. In Section 2, I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence, the tension: the view according to which logic is normative for thought seems to be incompatible with the idea that abiding by the laws of logic forms a precondition for thought. In Section 1 of Part II, I survey a number of interpretations of Frege's conception of logic that deal with this question. I show that they are for the most part either normative readings (emphasising the former understanding of the nature of logic) or constitutive readings (emphasising the latter). Finally, in Section 2, I adjudicate the debate and aim at reconciling the normative and the constitutive strands in Frege's conception of logic.

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Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth

Cited by 26 publications

References 12 publications

Frege's Conception of Truth: Two Readings

Frege's Conception of Truth: Two Readings

Frege on Anti‐Psychologism and the Role of Logic in Thinking

Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought I

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