French public attitudes towards the prospect of war in 1938 1939: 'pacifism' or 'war anxiety'?

Abstract

This article challenges the received wisdom that French public opinion was infused with pacifist sentiment during the 1930s, and that this sentiment in turn contributed to the French defeat of 1940. It will suggest that French public attitudes towards the prospect of war can be better defined as 'war anxiety' rather than the value-laden term 'pacifist'. Taking as a test case the period between the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and the outbreak of the Second World War less than a year later, the article will tease out the necessary distinction between 'pacifism' and 'war anxiety'. By employing a notion of 'representations' of public opinion, it will be shown how French opinion was demonstrably less pacifist than many existing analyses assume. Instead, it will be contended that the public's anxieties with regard to a future war manifested themselves in a variety of ways, of which pacifism was merely one marginal example. Indeed, 'war anxiety' increasingly demanded that France prepare for an inevitable conflict, in stark contrast to simply retreating into a defeatist mindset and thus establishing the conditions for the defeat in 1940.Pacifism is widely regarded to have been a defining characteristic of public attitudes towards the prospect of war in interwar France.

Extending Democracy: Railway Workers and the Popular Front in France, 1936–1938

“…Support for Munich, argues Daniel Hucker, proved ephemeral, the government's firm response to Italian demands over Corsica, Nice and Haute-Savoie met with strong public approval. 43 For Daladier, meeting the international challenges faced by France necessitated a decisive break from Popular Front economic organization. In early November the Prime Minister served time on the Popular Front experiment, removing the centrist supporter of greater state regulation of the economy, Paul Marchandeau, and replacing him with the 'champion of economic liberalism' Paul Reynaud.…”

Jules Romains' Vision of a United Europe in Interwar France: Legacy and Ambiguities

“…Romains' statements about refugees echoed the Ligue internationale des combattants pour la paix who were alarmed by the antiGerman and pro-war propaganda they were spreading (Ingram 2004, 323). Romains can therefore be seen as a good example of the pacifism and what has been called the "war anxiety" (Hucker 2007) of large sections of the French population and politicians at the time, spawned by the horrors of the First World War. Peace was more important than defeating fascism (Vaisse and Adamthwaite 1993) and any action designed to prevent war was to be applauded.…”

Veikti, nedera ignoruoti: Prancūzijos reakcija į 1938–1939 m. Lietuvai įteiktus ultimatumus

“…Diplomatišką postūmį galima įžvelgti ir kovo 16 d. paskelbtame Prancūzijos valstybinės telegramų agentūros pranešime apie Lietuvos ir Lenkijos konflikto raidą: "spauda priskiria Varšuvos vyriausybei polinkį Kaunui taikyti metodus, kuriais Vokietijos fiureris įgyvendino anšliusą" [5,47]. Lenkijos pasirinktas spaudimo Lietuvai būdas periodikoje vadintas barbarišku, pavojingu, neatsakingu, perdėta reakcija ir ydinga praktika.…”

“…Prancūzijos užsienio politikos siekis per visą tarpukarį išvengti naujo karo [37,47] itin sustiprėjo nagrinėjamu laikotarpiu. Istoriografijoje pabrėžiama, jog bandymai paveikti Čekoslovakijos likimą, sušvelninant agresyvią Vokietijos laikyseną, ir desperatiška įtakingų sąjungininkių paieška buvo esminės to meto Prancūzijos užsienio politikos problemos [49; 50; 54; 57].…”