Fried Eggs, Thermodynamics, and the Special Sciences

Dunn, Jeffrey

doi:10.1093/bjps/axq012

Cited by 22 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…See Albert [10] for a discussion. 20 Maudlin suggested in discussion that if the uniform probability distribution accomplishes all Albert claims for it, then infinitely many other distributions will do as well. This may be so.…”

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confidence: 99%

The emergence of time's arrows and special science laws from physics

Loewer

2011

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In this paper, I will argue that there is an important connection between two questions concerning how certain features of the macro world emerge from the laws and processes of fundamental microphysics and suggest an approach to answering these questions. The approach involves a kind of emergence but quite different from ‘top-down’ emergence discussed at the conference, for which an earlier version of this paper was written. The two questions are (i) How do ‘the arrows of time’ emerge from microphysics? (ii) How do macroscopic special science laws and causation emerge from microphysics? Answering these questions is especially urgent for those, who like myself, think that a certain version of physicalism, which I call ‘micro-physical completeness’ (MC), is true. According to MC, there are fundamental dynamical laws that completely govern (deterministically or probabilistically), the evolution of all micro-physical events and there are no additional ontologically independent dynamical or causal special science laws. In other words, there is no ontologically independent ‘top-down’ causation. Of course, MC does not imply that physicists now or ever will know or propose the complete laws of physics. Or even if the complete laws were known we would know how special science properties and laws reduce to laws and properties of fundamental physics. Rather, MC is a contingent metaphysical claim about the laws of our world. After a discussion of the two questions, I will argue the key to showing how it is possible for the arrows of time and the special science laws to emerge from microphysics and a certain account of how thermodynamics is related to fundamental dynamical laws.

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confidence: 99%

The emergence of time's arrows and special science laws from physics

Loewer

2011

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“…Lewis (, 478–482, , 366–368, , xi, xiv–xv, 121–131) was the first to develop such an account in detail, with related accounts proposed by Schrenk (), Cohen and Callender (), Callender and Cohen (), Callender (), Dunn (, 80–92), Frisch (), and Frigg and Hoefer (). The focus of the next section will be on articulating how the objective chancehood of SM probabilities and special science probabilities deriving from distributions over underlying state spaces plausibly follows from an appropriate Best System account of chance.…”

Section: Derivation Of Probabilistic Approximations To Deterministic mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, for example, in response to a worry raised by Elga () about whether Lewis's similarity metric delivers an asymmetry of counterfactual dependence, Dunn () suggests modifying Lewis's metric so that, other things being equal, worlds obeying SLT and also the various special science laws come out closer to the actual world than those that don't. Such a proposal would seem to ensure that SLT and LE underwrite the truth of those counterfactuals—like (in SLT's case) ‘If I had placed the ice cube in the hot water, then it would have melted quickly’ and (in LE's case) ‘If we had culled half of the population, then the per capita growth rate would now be higher’—needed to support causal/explanatory relations after all…”

Section: Potential Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ceteris ParibusLaws andMinutis RectisLaws

Fenton-Glynn

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Special science generalizations admit of exceptions. Among the class of non-exceptionless special science generalizations, I distinguish (what I will call) minutis rectis (mr) generalizations from the more familiar category of ceteris paribus (cp) generalizations. I argue that the challenges involved in showing that mr generalizations can play the law role are underappreciated, and quite different from those involved in showing that cp generalizations can do so. I outline a strategy for meeting the challenges posed by mr generalizations.

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“…38. Such arguments have been advanced by, inter alia, Loewer (2001;, Callender and Cohen (2009;2010), dunn (2011), Frisch (2014b, Glynn (2010), and . 39.…”

Section: High-level Chances?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There High-Level Causation?

Fenton-Glynn¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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The discovery of causal relations seems a central activity of the high-level sciences, including the special sciences and certain branches of macrophysics. Those same sciences are less successful in formulating exceptionless laws. if causation must be underwritten by exceptionless laws, we are faced with a puzzle. Attempts have been made to dissolve this puzzle by showing that non-exceptionless generalizations can underwrite causal relations. The trouble is that many of these attempts fail to distinguish between two importantly different types of exception of which highlevel scientific generalizations admit. roughly speaking, one is where the values of high-level variables not represented in the generalization are abnormal: call these 'background factor' (bf) exceptions. For example, the ideal Gas Law (iGL) may be significantly violated by a gas if a strong electric current is passed through it. Another is where the high-level states that are represented by variables in the generalization are realized in certain abnormal ways: call these 'mr exceptions' (exceptions having to do with the multiple realizability of high-level states). For example, the pressure of a gas may not be proportional to its temperature and volume in the way that the iGL describes if the initial macrostate of the gas is realized in a certain unusual microphysical way. While existing attempts to show that non-exceptionless generalizations can underwrite causal relations tend to work well where the generalization admits only of bf exceptions, they work less well when the generalizations in question admit-as most high-level scientific generalizations do-of mr exceptions. i argue that the best prospect for resolving the apparent problem posed by mr exceptions is to regard the generalizations which admit of them as approximations to probabilistic generalizations which don't, and which are themselves able to support relations of probabilistic causation.

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Fried Eggs, Thermodynamics, and the Special Sciences

Cited by 22 publications

References 16 publications

The emergence of time's arrows and special science laws from physics

The emergence of time's arrows and special science laws from physics

Ceteris ParibusLaws andMinutis RectisLaws

Is There High-Level Causation?

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