From a necessary being to god

Rasmussen, Joshua

doi:10.1007/s11153-008-9191-8

Cited by 9 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Discussion of these objections, as suggested above, tends to be the focus of attention in evaluating Leibnizian arguments of this kind. However, a separate objection to these arguments, where they are taken to be parts of arguments for the existence of God, focuses on the fact that 4 Gellman 2000, Pruss 2009, and Rasmussen 2009. In this paper, I develop a simple, abductive alternative.…”

Section: T Ryan Byerlymentioning

confidence: 99%

From a necessary being to a perfect being

Byerly

2018

Analysis

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Section: T Ryan Byerlymentioning

confidence: 99%

From a necessary being to a perfect being

Byerly

2018

Analysis

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“…Therefore, we should deny the starting assumption that N’s power is limited. For arguments applying (L) to N’s knowledge and goodness, see Rasmussen (2009, 7–9).…”

Section: Step 3: From a Necessary Being To Godmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, sometimes an argument is given for thinking that if there were more than one Necessary Being, they would be bound together in a tight, unchangeable unity. See, for example, O’Connor (2006) and Rasmussen (2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…42 42 One reason to think a probabilistic law would be contingent is that it specifies a precise probability of an event, and it might seem that any such probability could have been at least slightly higher or lower. See Rasmussen (2009, 7‐9). Some theorists will disagree, however: they will say that all natural laws, be they statistical or not, are a matter of metaphysical necessity.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…44 44 E.g., see Clarke (33‐6), O’Connor (1996, 450‐3), Koons (1997, 199‐200), Gellman (2000), Rasmussen (2009, 5‐7). …”

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Cosmological Arguments from Contingency

Rasmussen

2010

Philosophy Compass

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Cosmological arguments from contingency attempt to show that there is a necessarily existing god‐like being on the basis of the fact that any concrete things exist at all. Such arguments are built out of the following components: (i) a causal principle that applies to non‐necessary entities of a certain category; (ii) a reason to think that if the causal principle is true, then there would have to be a necessarily existing concrete thing; (iii) a reason to think that the necessarily existing thing would be god‐like. In this essay, I discuss various ways of developing each of these components to produce an argument from contingency, and I point out classic objections and replies along the way. I also make note of some of the most recent developments in arguments from contingency and point out avenues for future research.

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Strategies for stage II of cosmological arguments

Ocampo

2024

Int J Philos Relig

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The following article will examine three argumentative strategies to address a recent topic of debate in the philosophy of religion known as the "Gap Problem." It aims to study the "Stage II" of cosmological arguments, where the goal is to establish the theistic properties or attributes that identify the first cause or necessary being with the concept of God. The unique contribution of this study lies in the formalized and systematic presentation of the various solutions proposed by authors in the philosophical field, synthesizing their central ideas and presenting them in the form of arguments.Historically, the development of the cosmological argument has focused on establishing Stage I, while Stage II has not received the same attention. 1 Therefore, in this article, we will focus on the study of Stage II, presenting the different approaches and arguments put forth by contemporary philosophers to "close" the gap between these two stages and solve the so-called "Gap Problem." Is the "Gap Problem" a real problem?Conceptually, there is a central issue with the so-called "Gap Problem," and that is that it doesn't pose a true problem for the theist. This is because, generally, theistic arguments (in this case, cosmological arguments) are presented as pieces of evidence in favor of theism as a metaphysical worldview. The role of the argument in this case is to demonstrate the reasonableness of theism and increase its probability, even if Stage II of the argument has not been analyzed.To illustrate this point, let's use a generic cosmological argument as an example:1. Something exists. 2. If everything is contingent, then there is no external explanation for contingent things (why contingent things exist). 3. There is an external explanation for contingent things. 4. Therefore, not everything is contingent. 5. Therefore, something non-contingent exists. 6. Therefore, there exists a necessary entity. 2 1 There are some notable exceptions, particularly Thomas Aquinas, who dedicates almost the entire first book of his Summa Contra Gentiles to establish the divine attributes of esse subsistens (subsisting being). See Thomas Aquinas, Saint. Summa contra Gentiles I.

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From a necessary being to god

Cited by 9 publications

References 8 publications

From a necessary being to a perfect being

From a necessary being to a perfect being

Cosmological Arguments from Contingency

Strategies for stage II of cosmological arguments

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