In psychiatry we often speak of constructing "models." Here we try to make sense of what such a claim might mean, starting with the most fundamental question: "What is (and isn't) a model?". We then discuss, in a concrete measurable sense, what it means for a model to be useful. In so doing, we first identify the added value that a computational model can provide, in the context of accuracy and power. We then present the limitations of standard statistical methods and provide suggestions for how we can expand the explanatory power of our analyses by reconceptualizing statistical models as dynamical systems. Finally, we address the problem of model building-suggesting ways in which computational psychiatry can escape the potential for cognitive biases imposed by classical hypothesis-driven research, exploiting deep systemslevel information contained within neuroimaging data to advance our understanding of psychiatric neuroscience. .
Making sense of computational psychiatry3 Introduction. Psychiatry frequently refers to models. At its very basis, a model is a heuristic: a way to make sense of a complex set of interactions and relationships by virtue of a simple rule. Psychiatry's earliest models attempted to explain the psyche, and therefore deviations from its norms, using heuristics based on psychoanalytic theories on the influence of, often unconscious, childhood experiences and defense mechanisms (Fig. 1A). These conceptual models persist today; for example, attachment parenting identifies various behavioral pathologies emerging later in life as the consequence of inadequate parental responsiveness during a child's early years. However, as psychiatry has embraced rapid gains made possible by noninvasive neuroimaging, most current psychiatric models now explicitly incorporate information about the brain, with corresponding interest in "circuits." These tend to integrate neural and psychological frameworks; for example, by describing "regulation" within region-of-interest (ROI)-scale systems schematically described by arrows connecting boxes representing regions associated with different psychologically defined functions (e.g., "fear," "craving," and "willpower").In contrast, the term "circuit" in basic neuroscience is typically used to refer to microcircuits, in which biophysical processes, such as changing resting membrane potentials, modulate signal response. As with recent elegant work on thalamocortical adaptive sensory gating (Mease et al., 2014;Manita et al., 2015), these can take the form of complex control processes, which are normally derived from rodent electrophysiology, optogenetic, and DREADDs data. While some clinical neuroscience models (Fig. 1B) are also dynamical systems as defined by control systems engineering (Fig. 1C) (that is, they describe systems as a whole that can predict trajectories over time), the more typical use of the term circuit, as currently used within the clinical neuroscience literature, reflects co-activation between regions, defined by correlations. These co-activated stru...