2023
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-023-01198-5
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From boots to suits: do military directors protect shareholders’ wealth?

Tasawar Nawaz,
Roszaini Haniffa,
Mohammad Hudaib

Abstract: This paper explores the influence of military directors in protecting shareholders’ wealth through CEO compensation and corporate dividend payout policies. Based on manually collected data on corporate boards of non-financial companies operating in Pakistan, the results indicate a significant negative association between the presence of military directors on corporate boards and CEO compensation, thus supporting the notion that such directors are effective in monitoring and curtailing excessive rent seeking be… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Third, by drawing empirical evidence from an interventionist emerging economy i.e. Pakistan, our finding broadens the scope of the current theory on military directors in another cultural context characterised by lower shareholder protection, weak governance, higher market volatility, lower corporate growth, dominance of family-owned business groups, strong corporate-political connections, and high military interventions in political and economic affairs (Nawaz et al 2023). Fourth, we enrich and supplement the ongoing scholarly debate around outside directs' attributes (e.g., Armstrong et al 2014;Ferreira et al 2011;Gul et al 2011;Huang and Ni 2017).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 58%
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“…Third, by drawing empirical evidence from an interventionist emerging economy i.e. Pakistan, our finding broadens the scope of the current theory on military directors in another cultural context characterised by lower shareholder protection, weak governance, higher market volatility, lower corporate growth, dominance of family-owned business groups, strong corporate-political connections, and high military interventions in political and economic affairs (Nawaz et al 2023). Fourth, we enrich and supplement the ongoing scholarly debate around outside directs' attributes (e.g., Armstrong et al 2014;Ferreira et al 2011;Gul et al 2011;Huang and Ni 2017).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 58%
“…However, board's ability to monitor and advise the agents is largely determined by the knowledge, experience, and expertise of the board of directors. Diversified boards, in terms of gender (Adams and Ferreira 2009), expertise and experience (Huang et al 2016) as well as with particular backgrounds such as with military service experience (Benmelech and Frydman 2015;Nawaz et al 2023) have direct implications for corporate outcomes.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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